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ABSTRACT 
“EYE FOR AN EYE” OR “TURN THE OTHER CHEEK?” 
EXPLORING THE MODERATING ROLES OF REVENGE AND FORGIVENESS 
WHEN EXAMINING DEATH PENALTY SUPPORT AND 
RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM 
by William Howard Whited 
August 2016 
Public attitudes towards the death penalty appear to influence the usage of 
legislative policies about this highly debated sanction in the United States.  However, 
existing ways of measuring public opinion about the death penalty are limited in the 
information that they provide.  As such, one purpose of the study was to further develop 
the Revised Attitudes towards the Death Penalty Scale (RATDP), an instrument that 
measures level of support for the death penalty and is inclusive of the rationales that both 
proponents and opponents use to justify their stance.  Support for a five-factor structure 
of the RATDP was found in an exploratory factor analysis of an American non-student 
sample (N = 401) and then replicated in two separate confirmatory factor analyses 
utilizing non-student (N = 357) and student (N = 460) data.  Initial evidence for the 
RATDP’s reliability and validity was also found, particularly among non-students.  The 
study also further assessed the relationship between religious fundamentalism and death 
penalty support, as well as the moderating influence of forgiveness and revenge in this 
relationship in both samples of American non-students (N = 347) and students (N = 380).  
Forgiveness and revenge were not found to moderate the relationship between religious 
fundamentalism and death penalty support for either sample.  However, religious 
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fundamentalism, forgiveness, and revenge all predicted level of death penalty support 
among both non-students and students.  The implications of conceptualizing death 
penalty attitudes as a multifaceted construct that is associated with multiple variables 
(e.g., religious fundamentalism, revenge, forgiveness) are discussed in terms of future 
research and jury selection in capital cases. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Capital punishment continues to be a highly salient and hotly contested moral and 
political issue in the United States.  Recent findings from large-scale political surveys 
indicate that the majority of Americans (i.e., 63% from Gallup poll, 56% from Pew 
survey; Jones, 2014; Pew Research Center, 2015) continue to support the general use of 
the death penalty; however, death penalty support has gradually decreased since its peak 
of 80% in 1994 and is currently at its lowest level of support since the 1970s.  It is often 
remarked that popular public support of the death penalty is likely necessary for its 
continued use in the United States (Ellsworth & Gross, 1994), particularly considering 
that public support for the sanction was at its lowest level in the United States around the 
time when the Supreme Court ruled that all death penalty sentences that existed at that 
time were unconstitutional (i.e., Furman v. Georgia, 1972).  However, majority support, 
in and of itself, may not be sufficient to retain the sanction given other countries’ 
eradication of the death penalty despite popular public support (Zimring & Hawkins, 
1986).  Simply put, the steady decrease in the public’s general support of the death 
penalty over the past several decades may be consequential to the sanction’s legislative 
status in America and merits a need for the continued research of attitudes towards the 
death penalty. 
Measurement of the public’s general support for the death penalty has been 
traditionally achieved through the use of large scale political polls and social research 
surveys, such as the aforementioned Pew and Gallup polls.  In these surveys, participants 
are typically asked a single question to measure their overall attitude towards the death 
penalty, such as “Are you in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted of 
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murder?” used by the Gallup poll, or “Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly 
oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?” used by the Pew survey.  
Response options given to participants are typically limited to only a handful of choices 
(e.g., “favor,” “oppose,” or “don’t know”).  Although some researchers advocate for the 
usage of this question to monitor overall trends in the public’s “global” belief in capital 
punishment (Moon, Wright, Cullen, & Fisher, 2000), there have been a variety of 
longstanding and outspoken critics of the usage of this ‘pro/con’ question (Ellsworth & 
Gross, 1994; Harris, 1986; Vidmar & Ellsworth, 1974; Wallace, 1989).  For example, 
Ellsworth and Gross (1994) notably stated that “Answers to this kind of question tell us 
little about what people think or feel or notice—why do they support or oppose capital 
punishment, what they know about it, how and to whom they believe it should be applied, 
how this attitude is related to their behavior or to other attitudes” (p. 21).  In other words, 
the simplicity of the standard question format stifles the acquisition of rich information 
about one’s stance on and knowledge about the death penalty. 
Moreover, recent studies suggest that having a general support for the death 
penalty is far different than endorsing the utilization of the sanction over other viable 
alternatives, such as life imprisonment.  In one of the most comprehensive large-scale 
surveys on the public’s opinion towards the death penalty, 61% of registered voters 
polled reported that they preferred another sentence besides the death penalty for those 
convicted of murder, including life imprisonment without parole and victim restitution 
(39%), life imprisonment without parole (13%), and life imprisonment with the 
possibility of parole (9%; Death Penalty Information Center, 2010).  These findings, 
suggesting that more individuals prefer an alternative sanction than capital punishment, 
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are replications of multiple other studies (e.g., Bowers, 1993; Bowers & Steiner, 1998; 
Bowers, Vandiver, & Dugan, 1994; Dieter, 1993; Sandys & McGarrell, 1995). 
Niven (2002) further suggested that the media is “bolstering an illusory majority” 
by its portrayal of the findings of surveys using the standard, single question to suggest 
that the death penalty is “indisputably favored” by the majority of Americans when other 
research asking more comprehensive questions, including the aforementioned studies, 
indicates that the death penalty is not the preferred sentence for murderers.  In an 
experiment, Niven found that a group of participants who read a more “realistic” account 
of the public’s attitude towards the death penalty (i.e., article stating that more Americans 
prefer a sanction of life imprisonment without parole in addition to financial restitution to 
the victim’s family than the death penalty) were less supportive of the sanction and 
believed the sanction would be used less in the next 20 years when compared to 
participants who read typical media coverage of the death penalty or those in a control 
group (i.e., read an article on an unrelated topic; Niven, 2002).   
Additionally, Murray (2003) found that participants tend to be less supportive of 
the death penalty after asking participants a series of questions (versus using a single 
item), including if they would support applying the death penalty to a variety of specific 
situations (e.g., the defendant was a woman or juvenile, murdered someone during a 
robbery, committed an act of terrorism, suffered extensive child abuse) and if they would 
support the commutation of a death penalty sentence under several additional 
considerations (e.g., existence of credible evidence suggesting innocence of defendant, 
defendant undergoes a religious conversion, defendant displays remorse).  Murray (2003) 
opined that only a multiple-question format can accurately gauge the circumstances in 
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which a person may or may not endorse support for the death penalty.  Taken together, 
these studies indicate that the standard single-item approach to measuring the death 
penalty lacks validity, erroneously implies that a majority of individuals prefer the death 
penalty, and supports the usage of a multiple-item measure of death penalty attitudes that 
captures the nuanced and contextual nature of the construct.   
Generally speaking, the existing multiple-item death penalty measures are few, 
dated, and tend to have poor psychometric properties.  By way of example, Thurstone’s 
25-item Attitudes Towards Capital Punishment Scale (Peterson, 1933) has been rarely 
used in death penalty literature and its item content consists of statements regarding 
general support and opposition of the death penalty.  For this measure, respondents are 
only given two response options for each item (i.e., agree, disagree).  Internal consistency 
for the measure appears to be in the low to adequate range (α = .59 - .88), depending on 
the study (Shaw & Wright, 1967).  Some support has been found for its convergent 
validity (e.g., moderate correlation with Thurstone’s Attitude toward Punishment of 
Criminal Scale).  Subsequently, both Andrich (1988) and Balogh and Mueller (1960) 
developed additional measures of death penalty attitudes.  The authors of both measures 
replicated Thurstone’s agree/disagree response option; however, the item content of their 
measures also included topics of deterrence and rehabilitation.  Limited support has been 
found for the reliability or validity of these measures (O’Neil, Patry, & Penrod, 2004; 
Shaw & Wright, 1967).   
O’Neil et al. (2004) provided a measure of death penalty attitudes that, when 
compared to the aforementioned measures, appears to have remarkably stronger 
psychometric properties.  They developed the Death Penalty Scale (DPS), a 15-item 
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measure with 5 underlying factors (i.e., General Support, Retribution and Revenge, Death 
Penalty is a Deterrent, Death Penalty is Cheaper, and Life Without Parole Allows Parole).  
They found support for convergent and divergent validity as well as generally adequate 
internal consistency (α = .87, .75, .85, .89, & .69, respectively) for each factor.  Support 
for predictive validity was also found for the general support factor.  However, although 
the measure’s item content included several items reflecting common rationales that 
supporters of the death penalty use (e.g., the cost-effectiveness of the death penalty as 
compared to life without parole), it neglected mention of the common rationales used by 
opponents of the death penalty (e.g., sanction is “uncivilized,” devalues worth of human 
life, brutalization effect, unequal sentencing of minorities).   
Considering the need for an updated measure of death penalty attitudes that 
includes item content reflecting the arguments of both proponents and opponents of the 
death penalty, Whited, Mandracchia, and Bennet (2014) sought to examine the factor 
structure and psychometric properties of an existing, but underdeveloped and 
unpublished death penalty attitudes measure: the Attitudes towards the Death Penalty 
Scale (ATDP; Hingula & Wrightsman, 2002).  Data were obtained in two phases from 
undergraduate students attending a university located in a southern region of the United 
States.   
In phase one, the data from 311 participants were analyzed in an exploratory 
factor analysis (principal factor analysis extraction method, oblique rotation).  This 
analysis yielded a five-factor model and 7 of the initial 23 items were removed due to 
poor loading or double-loading on the factors.  Factors included: Sentencing Disputes (4 
items related to typical issues involved in death penalty sentencing, e.g., appeals, judicial 
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recommendation), Sanction Exceptions (4 items concerning situations or types of 
defendants that can be exempt from receiving a death penalty sentence, e.g., defendants 
with a cognitive impairment), Crime Control (3 items involving the utility of the death 
penalty to serve as a deterrent or in an incapacitation function), Opposition Concerns (3 
items reflecting common rationales that death penalty opponents use to justify their 
stance), and Gender Equality (2 items suggesting that the utilization of the death penalty 
should be the same across genders).  In general, however, the internal consistency of 
several factors was fairly low (α = .60, .58, .79, .70, .60, respectively).   
In phase two of the study, a confirmatory factor analysis was run on data collected 
from an additional 341 participants to further explore the proposed 5-factor model of the 
ATDP and identify other issues that could be revised or further developed with this scale.  
The confirmatory factor analysis was performed using a maximum-likelihood estimated 
method.  Fit indices of the proposed 5 factor model were indicative of a poor fit with the 
chi-square (χ2 = 260.287 [df = 94; p < .0001]) and NFI (.802), a marginally adequate fit 
with the CFI (.859), and a reasonable fit with the RMSEA (.072; 90% CI = .062-.083).  
Two items were also identified as loading poorly onto their respective factor.  Given the 
relatively poor fit of the model as indicated by several fit indices, the poor internal 
consistency of the factors noted in the first phase, and the poor loadings of several items 
onto their factor, Whited et al. (2014) noted that additional item and factor development 
is warranted prior to the use of the ATDP in research settings.   
It is evident that contemporaneous measures of death penalty attitudes, such as the 
DPS and ATDP, have become more complex and multifaceted than the traditional single-
item measures commonly used in political polls.  The trend towards a more 
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comprehensive approach to measuring death penalty attitudes may be due, in part, to the 
oversimplification of a single-item measure: people give a wide variety of rationales to 
justify their stance on capital punishment.  More specifically, because people with the 
same ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ stance often rely on vastly different justifications for their stance, a 
single item cannot adequately depict attitudes towards the death penalty.  As such, a 
thorough exploration of the underlying factors that inform or provide the basis for one’s 
level of support for the death penalty is necessary to gather valuable information about 
the public’s support for the death penalty. 
Given the lengthy history of public polling about the death penalty in the United 
States, interestingly, the underlying rationales of one’s death penalty stance had not been 
researched until the 1970s (Ellsworth & Gross, 1994).  Research conducted since that 
time indicates that an individual’s stance on the death penalty may be founded on a 
variety of different rationales.  Furthermore, the common underlying rationales used by 
both proponents and opponents have begun to change within the last 20 to 30 years 
(Radelet & Borg, 2000).  For example, the argument of deterrence, or the notion that the 
usage of capital punishment prevents would-be murderers from committing murder, was 
once the most common reason given by death penalty supporters to justify their position 
(Thomas, 1977; Thomas & Foster, 1975; Vidmar, 1974; Vidmar & Ellsworth, 1974).  
However, the propagation of recent studies demonstrating that the usage of capital 
punishment does not lower crime or murder rates (see, e.g., Bailey, 1990; Kovandzic & 
Vieraitis, 2009) as well as the rejection of the deterrence argument by an overwhelming 
number of experts in criminology (see e.g., Radelet & Akers, 1996; Radelet & Lacock, 
2009) appears to have prompted a decrease in the usage of this rationale by some 
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proponents of the death penalty.  Interestingly, at a time when deterrence was still 
frequently cited as a top rationale among death penalty supporters, Ellsworth and Ross 
(1983) found that most proponents would still maintain their support of the sanction, even 
if it was found that life imprisonment had an equal deterrent utility.  Similarly, most 
death penalty opponents would also maintain their position, even if there was 
overwhelming evidence to suggest that it was more of a deterrent than life imprisonment 
(Ellsworth & Ross, 1983).  These studies indicate that besides deterrence, there are more 
salient underlying arguments that are used to justify one’s level of death penalty support.  
Besides deterrence, supporters of the death penalty use other instrumental or 
utilitarian rationales to justify their stance, including incapacitation (i.e., prevention of the 
convicted murderer from committing future serious criminal offences), maintenance of 
law and order, and cost (e.g., supposing that the completion of a death sentence is less 
costly than life imprisonment without parole; Ellsworth & Gross, 1994; Lambert, Clarke, 
& Lambert, 2004; Radelet & Borg, 2000; Tyler & Weber, 1982; Whitehead & 
Blankenship, 2000).  It appears that these rationales, while still sometimes referenced by 
death penalty supporters, are no longer as frequently endorsed as they were previously to 
justify their pro-death penalty stance (Radelet & Borg, 2000).  This could be due to 
research findings that fail to provide empirical support for the benefits of  incapacitation 
(e.g., finding that risk of repeat murder is low once released, convicted murderers exhibit 
lower rates of recidivism than other released felony offenders; Bendau, 1997; Marquart & 
Sorensen, 1989; Stanton, 1969) and firmly establishing the notion that the cost of 
completing a death sentence far exceeds the cost of life imprisonment without parole 
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(e.g., Dieter, 1992, 2009; Bohm, 1998; Spangenberg & Walsh, 1989).  Instead, it seems 
that the argument of retribution has begun to take center stage.  
Retribution is typically defined as the idea that criminals deserve to be punished 
in a manner proportional to their crime (Gerber & Jackson, 2013).  In other words, 
according to the notion of retribution, “justice is restored” when an offender receives a 
punishment that is proportionate to the amount of suffering and injustice that their crime 
caused (p. 256; Okimoto, Wenzel, & Feather, 2012).  Retribution was once touted as a 
less socially permissible or legitimate rationale for death penalty supporters to endorse 
than other strictly pragmatic and non-emotionally laden reasons (e.g., deterrence; Thomas 
& Foster, 1975; Vidmar & Ellsworth, 1974); however, retribution now appears to be 
much more socially acceptable and has been opined to be the “most important 
contemporary pro-death argument” (Radelet & Borg, 2000; p. 52).   The argument of 
retribution has been connected with support for the death penalty in numerous studies 
(e.g., Baker, Lambert, & Jenkins, 2005; Ellsworth & Gross, 1994; Ellsworth & Ross, 
1983; Firment & Geiselman, 1997; Lambert, Clarke, & Lambert, 2004; O’Neil et al., 
2004; Schadt & DeLisi, 2007; Tyler & Weber, 1982).  Although retribution is commonly 
conceptualized as a pragmatic manner of maintaining order and restoring balance, there 
appears to be a darker, vengeful, and more emotionally-laden component of the 
retribution argument.   
First proposed by von Hirsch (1976), there appear to be two dimensions of a 
retributive justice orientation that are cited in the literature: “just deserts” and revenge.  
The “just deserts” dimension of retribution follows the previously described and common 
understanding of retribution; that is, the administration of a proportional punishment to 
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the offender that is purposed to restore balance.  On the other hand, in “retribution as 
revenge,” punishment is administered not only just for the purpose of restoring a sense of 
balance, but also for exacting retaliation on the offender (von Hirsh, 1976).  Individuals 
endorsing revenge as the manner in which they believe justice should be served may take 
emotional pleasure in seeing the offender suffer and may advocate for offenders’ receipt 
of punishments that are disproportionately harsh relative to the severity of their 
wrongdoing (Finckenauer, 1988).  Gerber and Jackson (2013) found that the endorsement 
of the “revenge” dimension was positively correlated with right-wing authoritarianism 
and group-based dominance (i.e., preference of one’s in-group to dominate over a defined 
out-group) and predicted the support of harsher sentences and denial of due process 
rights.  In sum, it appears that death penalty proponents have recently decreased 
utilization of instrumental rationales (e.g., deterrence, incapacitation, cost) but have 
instead utilized more emotionally laden reasoning (e.g.,  retribution, revenge) to explain 
their stances. 
Similarly, opponents of the death penalty also appear to use both instrumental and 
symbolic (i.e., based on emotions and ideological self-image) arguments as justification 
for their disapproval of the sanction (Ellsworth & Gross, 1994; Tyler & Weber, 1982).  
Specifically, common rationales used by death penalty opponents include that the 
enforcement of the sanction is cruel, immoral, and/or uncivilized, does not permit 
rehabilitation of offenders, is unfairly dispersed (e.g., disproportionately higher when 
defendants are a racial minority and/or poor, and cases in which there is a White victim), 
perpetuates a cycle of violence by punishing murder with death (i.e., the brutalization 
effect), and could lead to the execution of an innocent individual (see, e.g., Baker, 
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Lambert, & Jenkins, 2005; Ellsworth & Gross, 1994; Firment & Geiselman, 1997; 
Lambert et al., 2004).  Of these rationales, Ellsworth and Gross (1994) suggested that the 
most salient reasons that underlie abolitionists’ stance are not utilitarian, but rather based 
on the emotional idea that the death penalty is morally wrong and/or against religious 
convictions.   
Interestingly, both abolitionists and proponents of the death penalty use their 
religious beliefs or convictions to inform or determine their attitude towards the sentence.  
For instance, both groups use religious texts and phrases such as “turn the other cheek,” 
and “eye for an eye” to justify their positions (Cook & Powell, 2003).  The common use 
of religious explanations for death penalty stances has led many researchers to further 
explore the link between attitudes towards capital punishment and religion.  Researchers 
have found that some religious beliefs (e.g., importance of religion to an individual) and 
behaviors (e.g., church attendance) are consistently predictive of opposition to the death 
penalty (Britt, 1998; Grasmick, Cochran, Bursik, & Kimpel, 1993; Grasmick, Davenport, 
Chamlin, & Bursik, 1992); however, it appears that the vast majority of religious 
variables (e.g., Biblical literalism, religious activity, being “born again,” adherence to a 
conservative theology, belief that human nature is corrupt) have consistently been found 
to be unrelated to death penalty support (see Unnever, Cullen, & Applegate, 2005).  
Furthermore, some religious variables studied in conjunction with attitudes towards the 
death penalty have an inconsistent predictive relationship with support for the death 
penalty in the literature.   
One religious variable that has been shown to be inconsistently related to death 
penalty support is religious fundamentalism.  Religious fundamentalism is a construct 
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that has been frequently examined in the death penalty literature and is of particular 
interest to researchers due to the increased promotion of instituting punitive correctional 
policies (including capital punishment) by conservative or “right-wing” religious leaders 
as a way to enhance society’s moral compass (Unnever, Cullen, & Applegate, 2005).  
Religious fundamentalists in the United States are often viewed as a monolithic socio-
religious force of conservative Christians that share similarly conservative religious and 
political beliefs (Ammerman, 1987).  Although “fundamentalists” in the United States 
have mostly been researched within the Christian religion in the death penalty literature, 
the construct of religious fundamentalism appears to have a much broader 
conceptualization.  Specifically, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) view religious 
fundamentalism as a global construct that can be present among individuals of any 
religious background.  They define religious fundamentalism as: 
The belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the 
fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; 
that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of evil which must be 
vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the 
fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and 
follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity. (p. 
118) 
Heriot (2009) supported this conceptualization of religious fundamentalism and added 
that fundamentalists appear to have a fear of, feel threatened by, and choose to fight 
against “modernism.”  He also placed a larger emphasis on the social, instead of the 
individual, belief system and the salience of social phenomena (e.g., in-group vs. out-
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group) among fundamentalist groups.  More exactly, Kirkpatrick (2005) noted that a 
primary characteristic of religious fundamentalism is “establishing and defending a 
particular set of beliefs and practices that define an in-group; those failing to accept and 
live by these particular standards are assigned to the out-group” (p. 265).  Altogether, it 
appears that the religious fundamentalists exist within any religion, have a comprehensive 
system of religious beliefs that they assume is the absolute and sole truth, are heavily 
embedded in their respective faith community (i.e., in-group), and vehemently stand in 
opposition of any attempts to stray from traditional religious practices and teachings. 
 Theoretically, religious fundamentalists are assumed to be supportive of the death 
penalty for several reasons, including their tendency to view their god(s) as a harsh, 
hierarchical, and punitive deity (Greely, 1995), literal interpretation of punitive scriptures 
(e.g., passages such as “Eye for an eye;” Unnever & Cullen, 2006), staunch acceptance of 
their religious leaders’ interpretation of scriptures (Ellison & Musick 1993; Grasmick et 
al., 1993; Ellison & Sherkat, 1993), and belief that criminal behavior is sinful and 
intentionally carried out (i.e., criminal actions are attributed to the perpetrator’s choices, 
not considered a product of unfortunate or unfair environmental conditions; Unnever & 
Cullen, 2006).  Although a theoretical case has been made for religious fundamentalists 
to be more supportive of capital punishment than those with more liberal religious 
attitudes and beliefs, researchers attempting to empirically examine this relationship have 
been hampered by difficulties with operationalizing a definition of religious 
fundamentalism. 
The majority of research examining religious fundamentalist’s attitudes towards 
the death penalty has utilized denominational affiliation as the primary operationalization 
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strategy for the identification of those adhering to a religious fundamentalist belief 
system.  Specifically, these studies have utilized Smith’s (1990) FUND categorization 
system to operationalize religious fundamentalism.  Smith’s (1990) FUND system 
organizes approximately 170 Protestant Christian denominations (as well as Judaism and 
Catholicism) into one of three categories ranging on a continuum from fundamentalism to 
liberalism (i.e., Fundamentalist, Moderate, Liberal) through the use of several 
categorization strategies (e.g., utilization of prior classification schemes, membership of 
denominations in theological movements, surveys of clergy, denominational theological 
doctrine). 
The literature comparing the relationship between the affiliation with a 
fundamentalist denomination and death penalty support has inconsistent findings.  More 
specifically, fundamentalist denominational affiliation, measured by FUND, positively 
predicted death penalty support in some studies (Britt, 1998; Grasmick et al., 1993; 
Unnever, Cullen, & Bartkowski, 2006; Young, 1992).  Fundamentalist affiliation has also 
predicted death penalty support after accounting for covariates in other studies (e.g., race, 
political conservatism; Britt, 1998; Unnever & Cullen, 2007; Young, 1992).  However, 
many studies have found no statistically significant predictive relationship between the 
affiliation with a fundamentalist denomination and death penalty support (Baumer, 
Messner, & Rosenfeld, 2003; Cochran, Boots, & Heide, 2003; Messner, Baumer, & 
Rosenfeld, 2006; Sandys & McGarrell, 1997; Unnever & Cullen, 2005, 2006; Unnever, 
Cullen, & Fisher, 2007). 
 Despite its widespread use by penologists, the employment of FUND as a 
measure of religious fundamentalism has been widely criticized.  Some authors note that 
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the use of any denominational affiliation categorization system, such as FUND, is not a 
valid way to measure complex religious constructs (Fulton, 1997; Gorsuch, 1998).  This 
may be due to the noted variation within intradenominational churchgoers’ religious 
beliefs (Ammerman, 1982; Hunter 1982, 1991).  Simply put, a churchgoer’s personal 
religious beliefs are unlikely to be identical to the teachings and doctrine of their specific 
denomination.  Moreover, several scholars have identified various empirical problems 
with using the FUND system specifically, including its (a) inflated designation of about 
30% of all Americans as belonging to a fundamentalist Christian denomination when 
“religious fundamentalists” more accurately refers to a small group within the Christian 
population (Kellstedt & Smidt, 1996) and (b) inclusion of denominations with divergent 
cultural traditions and political attitudes into the same category (e.g., categorizing both 
Black Protestant denominations and Evangelical denominations as fundamentalist; 
Steensland et al., 2000).  At best, the use of FUND serves only as an imprecise proxy 
measure of religious fundamentalism (Applegate, Cullen, Fisher, & Vander Ven, 2000); 
at worst, FUND is an invalid measure of fundamentalism with inherent weaknesses that 
severely limits the interpretation, generalizability, and implications of prior significant 
research findings in which it was employed. 
Besides using denominational affiliation, other scholars have operationalized 
religious fundamentalism by measuring the extent to which individuals agree with 
fundamentalist beliefs or practices.  One such characteristic that fundamentalists are 
believed to share is perceiving God as a harsh, hierarchical, and punitive deity (e.g., 
emphasizing descriptions of God as a father, master, judge, and/or king rather than a 
mother, spouse, lover, and/or friend).  There has been some exploration into how the way 
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Christians perceive the image of God relates to their attitudes towards capital 
punishment.  For instance, Unnever and Cullen (2006) found that individuals who view 
God as harsh and punitive were significantly more likely to be supportive of the death 
penalty than their counterparts.  More recently, Bader, Desmond, Mencken, and Johnson 
(2010) found that, after accounting for several other factors, possessing an image of God 
as a judgmental or angry deity was significantly related to support for the death penalty 
and shares the strongest association with support for the death penalty.  Dissimilarly, 
however, other investigations have not found a significant relationship between 
possessing a punitive image of God and supportive attitudes towards the capital 
punishment (Applegate et al., 2000; Evans & Adams, 2003). 
Biblical or scriptural literalism is another aspect of religiosity that has been 
theoretically and empirically tied to religious fundamentalism in the literature.  For 
example, Unnever and Cullen (2006) found that churchgoers affiliated with 
fundamentalist denominations were over 4 times more likely to interpret the Bible in a 
literal fashion than their non-affiliate counterparts.  There is some empirical evidence to 
suggest that biblical literalism is linked with death penalty support (Miller & Hayward, 
2008; Stack, 2004; Young, 1992).  However, several other studies have failed to find a 
significant relationship between biblical literalism and support for the death penalty after 
accounting for a series of covariates (Applegate et al., 2000; Britt, 1998; Sandys & 
McGarrell, 1997; Unnever, Cullen, & Applegate, 2005; Unnever & Cullen, 2006). 
Unique to other measurement approaches for religious fundamentalism, Soss, 
Langbein, and Metelko (2003) asked participants in their nation-wide study to identify 
themselves as a religious fundamentalist to explore whether or not these persons were 
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more supportive of capital punishment; however, they did not find a significant predictive 
relationship between the two constructs.  Using a similar self-identification approach to 
measure fundamentalism, Vogel and Vogel (2003) found a significant relationship with 
support for the use of the death penalty with adult offenders, but not juvenile offenders.  
Finally, Miller and Hayward (2008) operationalized religious fundamentalism by 
utilizing a short, 6-item measure of “religious orthodoxy” published by Putney and 
Middleton (1961).  Although Miller and Hayward found a positive predictive relationship 
between higher levels of fundamentalism and death penalty support, several limitations of 
their fundamentalism measure (e.g., age of measure, lack of strong psychometric 
properties) hinder the generalizability of their findings. 
Generally speaking, no matter how religious fundamentalism is operationalized, 
there appears to be inconsistent findings regarding the presence (or lack thereof) of a 
significant relationship between death penalty support and religious fundamentalism.  
Noticing these discrepancies, Whited, Mandracchia, Mohn, and Dahlen (2014) 
endeavored to further explore the relationship between death penalty support and 
religious fundamentalism.  They employed a psychometrically-sound instrument of 
religious fundamentalism (i.e., Revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale [RRF]; 
Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004) and compared its ability to statistically predict level of 
support for the death penalty with the traditionally utilized, but commonly criticized 
FUND classification system (Smith, 1990).  These authors found that fundamentalist 
denominational affiliation, as measured by FUND, had a positive predictive relationship 
with level of support for the death penalty.  However, religious fundamentalism, as 
measured by the RRF, was not statistically predictive of favorable attitudes towards the 
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death penalty.   As such, Whited et al.’s (2014) findings suggested that there are distinct 
differences between the constructs of fundamentalist denominational affiliation (FUND) 
and religious fundamentalism that lend additional support to the rendering of FUND an 
invalid measure of religious fundamentalism. 
Moreover, Whited et al. (2014) also agreed with Unnever and Cullen’s (2006) 
postulation that the inconsistent findings in the extant literature between death penalty 
support and fundamentalism denomination affiliation may not only be due to 
measurement error, but could also be due to the conflicting system of beliefs and 
characteristics within religious fundamentalists.  For example, Christian fundamentalists 
that literally interpret Biblical passages are tasked with the application of seemingly 
contrasting passages related to the punishment of offenders, such as “Eye for an eye, 
tooth for a tooth” (Exodus 21:24; Leviticus 24:20; Deuteronomy 19:21, New 
International Version [NIV]) and “Whoever takes the life of any human being shall be 
put to death” (Leviticus 24:17, NIV), with other passages including “But, if you do not 
forgive men their sins, your Father will not forgive your sins” (Matthew 6:15, NIV) and 
“Do not resist an evil person.  If someone strikes you on the right check, turn to him the 
other also” (Romans 12:17, NIV).  Consequently, it is not surprising that Unnever and 
Cullen (2006) found that even though churchgoers of fundamentalist denominations have 
more pro-punitive characteristics (e.g., conceptualize God as a harsh deity) than affiliates 
of more liberal denominations, they are also more inclined to possess higher levels of 
anti-retributive characteristics, such as forgiving and compassionate beliefs.  Considering 
these findings, it is reasonable to suggest some fundamentalists have more pronounced 
retributive characteristics and are therefore inclined to assert that crime should be dealt 
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with in a punitive and/or vengeful manner, whereas other fundamentalists have a more 
pronounced forgiving, rehabilitative, and/or restorative attitudinal stance towards the 
treatment of offenders.  As such, in order to better understand the association between 
religious fundamentalism and death penalty support, it is essential to consider that the 
relationship between these constructs may vary as a function of other factors, such as 
forgiveness and vengeance. 
Upon examining the extant literature on the construct of forgiveness, it is evident 
that there are many working definitions of forgiveness.  These varying conceptualizations 
of forgiveness are sometimes conflicting (e.g., seen as a strength versus a limitation), and 
the construct of forgiveness is often confused with, or incorrectly believed to be 
equivalent to, several related yet distinct constructs (e.g., reconciliation, pardoning, 
excusing, pseudoforgiveness; Enright, 1996; Worthington, 2000).  Most researchers, 
however, consistently adhere to the notion that the trait or behavior of forgiveness is an 
adaptive coping strategy (e.g., McCullough, 2000), and forgiveness is linked with overall 
psychological well-being and life satisfaction (e.g., Witvliet, 2001).  Forgiveness is 
generally viewed as a reduction of negative responses (e.g., thoughts, motivations, 
emotions, and behaviors) towards a transgression along with an installment of neutral or 
positive responses towards a transgressor (for an extended review of forgiveness 
definitions, see Worthington, 2000).  Thompson et al. (2005) noted that “the source of a 
transgression, and therefore the object of forgiveness, may be oneself, another person or 
persons, or a situation that one views as being beyond anyone’s control (e.g., an illness, 
‘fate,’ or a natural disaster)” (p. 318).  Forgiveness is highly valued in most religions, 
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including major religions such as Christianity (Marty, 1998), Judaism (Dorff, 1998), 
Islam (Rye et al., 2000), and Buddhism (Rye et al., 2000).   
Several meta-analyses examining research on religion/spirituality and forgiveness 
have discovered that religion has a small to moderate correlation with forgiveness, 
depending on how forgiveness is measured (Davis, Worthington, Hook, & Hill, 2013; 
Fehr, Gelfand, & Nag, 2010; McCullough & Worthington, 1999).  More specifically, 
when measured as a trait or disposition (i.e., a generally pervasive and persistent 
tendency to be forgiving), forgiveness is moderately correlated with religion or 
spirituality measures (e.g., r = .29; Davis et al., 2013).  However, forgiveness has a much 
weaker correlation (e.g., r = .15; Davis et al., 2013) with religion when forgiveness is 
measured as a state (i.e., how forgiving an individual is towards a specific, identifiable 
transgressor or transgression at one particular point in time). 
Although forgiveness is a construct with an extensive body of literature, there is a 
shortage of research examining forgiveness in the context of religious fundamentalism.  
In fact, it appears that only one study (i.e., Brown, Barnes, & Campbell, 2007) has 
examined these two constructs.  In a sample of college students, religious 
fundamentalism (as measured by the RRF scale) was positively and significantly related 
to a measure of general attitudes favoring forgiveness (e.g., “I believe that forgiveness is 
a moral virtue”), even after accounting for gender and religious orthodoxy (Brown et al., 
2007).  However, religious fundamentalism was not statistically predictive of an 
individual’s tendency to forgive others that have specifically wronged them (e.g., “When 
people wrong me, my approach is just to forgive and forget”).  Therefore, those with a 
high level of fundamentalism appeared to desire or have positive attitudes towards 
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forgiveness, but not necessarily for forgiving specific transgressors.  The authors opined 
that these findings could be due to fundamentalists’ tendency to have a high need for 
structure and demonstrate cognitive rigidity, traits that have been found to lend 
themselves well to several potential forgiveness barriers (e.g., simplistic thinking, 
ambiguity intolerance, negative affectivity; Moskowitz, 1993; Neuberg & Newsom, 
1993; Schaller, Boyd, & Yohannes, 1995).   
As a second part of their study, Brown et al. (2007) discovered an interesting 
interaction between intrinsic religiosity (i.e., one’s usage of their religion as the 
framework by which they live; Allport & Ross, 1967), need for structure, and pro-
forgiveness attitudes in a second sample of college students.  Namely, they found that 
individuals with high religiosity and a rigid, structured cognitive style (conceptually 
descriptive of religious fundamentalists) had especially pronounced attitudes in favor of 
forgiveness compared to their counterparts (low religiosity individuals with little need for 
structure).  In summary, although there is a dearth of research examining forgiveness 
within the context of religious fundamentalism, Brown and colleagues’ work provides a 
glimpse of how two unique characteristics of some fundamentalists (i.e., their rigid 
cognitive style and need for structure) may cause religious fundamentalism to relate 
differently to forgiveness attitudes and tendencies than non-fundamentalists without these 
attributes that still possess a strong intrinsic religiosity. 
When considering the relationship between forgiveness and attitudes towards the 
punishment of criminals, including level of support for capital punishment, it is important 
to note that forgiveness does not equate to pardoning or freeing an offender from facing 
consequences from their actions; forgiveness can exist within the context of seeking 
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justice (Worthington, 2000).  Therefore, at least conceptually, the existence of 
forgiveness does not necessarily automatically or linearly precede an opposition to an 
offender’s receipt of criminal sanctions, including the death penalty.  However, it is 
difficult to determine if an empirical connection between forgiveness and support for the 
death penalty exists, particularly within religious individuals, due to an insufficient 
amount of quality research examining the relationship between these three constructs. 
In one of the few studies examining forgiveness and death penalty support, 
Applegate, Cullen, Fisher, and Vander Ven (2000) found that a 3 item measure of 
forgiveness (i.e., “hate the sin but love the sinner,” forgiveness is required by God, and 
forgiveness is without limit if the sinner is penitent) negatively predicted death penalty 
support along with other punitive measures (i.e., support for harsher court sanctions, and 
general punitiveness) by itself and after accounting for several covariates (e.g., age, race, 
gender, education, political affiliation, political conservatism, prior victimization) in a 
sample of Ohio residents.  Two other studies (Unnever & Cullen, 2006; Unnever, Cullen, 
& Applegate, 2005) examined data from large-scale social surveys and found that 
participants who expressed forgiving beliefs, using the same aforementioned 3-item 
forgiveness measure utilized by Applegate et al. (2000; i.e., items about self-forgiveness, 
forgiveness of others, and forgiveness from God), were significantly less likely to support 
the death penalty than their counterparts.   
Although there is some empirical evidence implicating a negative association 
between forgiveness and support for the death penalty, no study has directly examined if 
this relationship exists among those with a high level of religious fundamentalism.  
Unnever and Cullen (2006), however, found evidence for a possible relationship between 
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forgiveness and death penalty support in a sample of those affiliated with a 
fundamentalist denomination.  Specifically, they noted that both forgiveness and 
compassion, two anti-punitive characteristics, were positively and significantly associated 
with religious salience (e.g., the importance of a religion and religious practices to an 
individual) in a sample of fundamentalist denomination affiliates.  Religious salience, in 
turn, was negatively related to death penalty support in the same sample.  These authors 
postulated that the higher levels of religious salience in fundamentalist affiliates were 
responsible for the subsequent greater infusion of particular religious practices (e.g., 
compassion, forgiveness) that lessened their support for the death penalty.  Though this 
research provides a potentially useful theoretical understanding of a mechanism by which 
forgiveness may be associated with level of death penalty support in religious 
fundamentalists, the authors’ usage of FUND and a short, undeveloped measure of 
forgiveness to operationalize religious fundamentalism and forgiveness, respectively, 
undermines the generalizability of these findings.  Further research examining the 
relationships between these variables is warranted.  
Besides forgiveness, the construct of retribution has also been implicated as a trait 
that may influence the relationship between religious fundamentalism and death penalty 
support (Unnever & Cullen, 2006).  Although retribution and forgiveness are often 
considered to be antithetical motives for justice, Strelan and Van Prooijen (2013) found 
an interesting connection between the two constructs in their sample of European college 
students and community adults who reported that they had recently experienced a “deep 
hurt.”  Specifically, they found that for some participants (i.e., “victims” in the study), 
viewing offenders receive a punishment that was proportionate to their crime (i.e., a 
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retribution as “just deserts” perspective), indirectly facilitated the victims’ ability to 
forgive their offender. Dissimilarly, they found that seeking retribution from a revenge 
standpoint (i.e., belief that an offender should suffer and receive a punishment 
disproportionately worse than the original offense) was negatively correlated with 
forgiveness, and revenge did not serve as a significant mediator between punishment and 
forgiveness.  Strelan and Van Prooijen (2013) concluded that it was “just desert’s” 
capacity to restore a sense of balance and justice that served to facilitate forgiveness; 
alternatively, they suggested that possessing a revenge motivation for punishment likely 
only produces further interpersonal conflict and inhibits forgiveness. 
Therefore, of the two distinct forms of retribution designated by von Hirsh (1976), 
it appears that “retribution as revenge,” hereafter simply referred to as “revenge” or 
“vengeance,” reflects the harsher and more punitive punishment motivation that may 
facilitate supporting attitudes towards the death penalty in those with a high level of 
religious fundamentalism.  There are a small number of studies examining the 
relationship between either religious fundamentalism or religious characteristics 
possessed by fundamentalists (e.g., high religious conservatism, high religious 
attendance, punitive view of God) and vengeance.  Cota-McKinley, Woody, and Bell 
(2001), for instance, discovered that higher scores on a scale of religious conservative 
beliefs associated with Christianity (e.g., scriptures are the literal word of God, pre-
marital intercourse, homosexuality, and masturbation are sinful, creationism should be 
taught alongside evolution; Bensko, Canetto, Sugar, & Viney, 1995) were predictive of 
more vengeful attitudes and desires than those with lower levels of religious 
conservatism.  Moreover, Ellison and Musick (1991) found that among residents of the 
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southern region of the United States, both high attendance in religious meetings as well 
as punitive and hierarchical images of God served as positive statistical predictors of 
retaliatory violence (e.g., an individual’s use of violence in response to an offender 
hurting his/her child or spouse).  This relationship was not found among a nation-wide 
sample, which led the authors to hypothesize that certain aspects of the southern religious 
culture (e.g., fundamentalist view of God as wrathful, theology stressing Old Testament 
divine punishment) may justify some low-level vengeful behaviors.   
More recently, Greer, Berman, Varan, Bobrycki, and Watson (2005) found that 
several religious variables, including intrinsic religiosity (defined above), participation in 
several church activities, and high frequency in church attendance, were negatively 
related to vengeance attitudes.  Extrinsic religiosity (i.e., use of religion to suit one’s 
needs, such as security, sociability, and/or status; Allport & Ross, 1967) as well as a 
frequent church donation pattern were both positively related to vengeance attitudes.  
Finally, Miller (2013) found that high levels of religious fundamentalism, along with 
evangelism (i.e., belief in the necessity of converting others; Young, 1992) and extrinsic 
religiosity, were consistently significant predictors of greater leniency towards 
individuals who committed acts of vengeance against criminals who carried out different 
types of crime (i.e., murder, drug dealing, and child molestation).  In sum, the extant 
literature seems to provide an empirical connection between religious fundamentalism (or 
fundamentalist-like characteristics) and attitudes of revenge towards perpetrators. 
There also appears to be an empirical basis for the link between the endorsement 
of pro-revenge attitudes and support for capital punishment.  For instance, in a sample of 
Australian college students, McKee and Feather (2008) found that the higher adoption of 
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vengeance attitudes in participants positively predicted death penalty support, after 
accounting for conservation (i.e., valuing tradition, conformity, and security over 
openness-to-change) and self-enhancement (i.e., valuing power and achievement over 
self-transcendence).  Similarly, Schadt and DeLisi (2007) found that participants that 
endorsed vigilante beliefs (e.g., “If anyone ever victimized my family I would hurt the 
person responsible”) were significantly more likely to support the death penalty than their 
counterparts in a sample of American college students.  The findings of these two studies, 
along with the suppositions of other authors (Ellsworth & Gross, 1994; Finckenauer, 
1988), seem to suggest that there are, as described by Schadt and DeLisi (2007), several 
similar “ugly emotions” (e.g., revenge, vigilantism) that have at least a partial role in the 
informing of a death penalty support stance.  However, there is unfortunately a dearth of 
literature examining the impact of possessing a vengeful attitudinal stance on death 
penalty support among those with high levels of religious fundamentalism. 
Purpose of the Study 
Due to the longstanding concerns regarding the measurement of death penalty 
attitudes via single-item measures as well as the lack of updated multiple-item 
instruments of death penalty attitudes with strong psychometric properties, novel scales 
of death penalty attitudes are in need of development.  Even O’Neil and colleagues’ 
(2004) measure of death penalty attitudes, an exemplar of an instrument with a confirmed 
factor structure and otherwise strong psychometric properties, neglects inclusion of the 
arguments used by abolitionists in its item content.  As such, one purpose of the current 
study was to extend the development of a death penalty attitudes measure from the work 
demonstrated in Whited et al. (2014).  In particular, the current study sought to examine 
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and verify the factor structure of the Revised Attitudes Towards the Death Penalty Scale 
(RATDP) following the addition of several novel items as well as find support for the 
measure’s convergent validity and internal consistency.  In order to bolster the 
generalizability of the current study’s findings, data from both undergraduate college 
students and non-student adult samples were collected. 
Furthermore, the current study was used to further explore the nature of the 
relationship between religious fundamentalism and death penalty support.  Previous 
attempts at examining this relationship seem to have generated inconsistent and 
confusing findings, which is at least partially due to measurement error in the form of an 
overwhelming use of an invalid measure of religious fundamentalism, fundamentalist 
denominational affiliation (i.e., FUND; Smith, 1990).  To complicate matters, researchers 
have demonstrated that even when using a valid means of operationalizing religious 
fundamentalism, there is an absence of a statistically predictive relationship with level of 
death penalty support (Whited et al., 2014).  However, the suppositions of some 
penologists (e.g., Unnever & Cullen, 2006) paint a depiction of a complex relationship 
between religious fundamentalism and death penalty support, given that fundamentalists 
tend to have conflicting beliefs and characteristics (e.g., forgiving dispositions and 
retributive beliefs) that impact their attitudes towards the treatment of offenders. 
As such, it is reasonable to hypothesize that those possessing high levels of 
fundamentalism and a more pronounced forgiving nature are less likely to have high 
levels of support for the death penalty than their counterparts.  Or in other words, the 
relationship between religious fundamentalism and level of death penalty support may 
vary as a function of dispositional forgiveness.  Alternatively, it is reasonable to 
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hypothesize that those with high levels of fundamentalism and more pronounced attitudes 
of revenge are more likely to have high levels of support for the death penalty than their 
counterparts; that is, the relationship between religious fundamentalism and level of death 
penalty support may vary as a function of pro-revenge attitudes.  
In summary, in light of the aforementioned gaps in the literature, the current study 
had two general aims: (1) Continued development of a death penalty attitudes measure 
with item content that reflects the arguments used by both proponents of capital 
punishment and abolitionists, and (2) Further exploration of the association between 
religious fundamentalism and death penalty support by examining the extent to which 
forgiveness and revenge serve as moderators in the relationship.   
Research Questions 
 Four primary questions were evaluated in the current investigation, namely: 
1. What is the factor structure of the RATDP?  
2. How does the RATDP correlate with a different and psychometrically sound 
measure of death penalty attitudes? 
3. Do forgiveness and revenge moderate the relationship between religious 
fundamentalism and level of support for the death penalty?  
4. Do the constructs of forgiveness and revenge predict level of support for the 
death penalty? 
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CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
Participants 
Participants for this study came from two primary sources: an adult undergraduate 
student population and a non-student adult population.  In total, data were collected from 
1663 participants in the current study.  However, 444 of these participants (26.7%) were 
deleted from the study due to indications that they were inattentive to study content (see 
below for exclusionary criteria).  Therefore, the data from 1219 participants were 
analyzed in the current study.  A total of 758 participants served as the non-student 
sample; the student sample was comprised of 461 participants.  Demographic 
characteristics of the non-student and student samples are presented in Table 1. 
Participants in the student sample were adult male and female college students 
attending The University of Southern Mississippi.  Student participants were enrolled in 
psychology courses at the time of data collection and were recruited through Sona.  The 
student sample was predominately female (78.6%) and White (60.2%) and the mean age 
was 20.61 years (SD = 4.82, median = 19 years).  The majority of the students identified 
themselves as Freshmen (n = 195, 42.6%), followed by those self-classified as 
Sophomores (n = 109, 23.8%), Juniors (n = 84, 18.3%), Seniors (n = 66, 14.4%), and 
Other (n = 4, 0.9%). 
The non-student sample was composed of participants recruited through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) online marketplace (described below).  Similar to 
the student sample, the non-student participants were predominately female (61.2%) and 
White (80%).  The mean age for the non-student sample was 35.58 years (SD = 12.76,  
median = 31 years).  The non-student sample was well-educated, with 90.24% of  
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Table 1 
Frequencies of Non-Student and Student Participants by Demographic Category 
 
Type of Participant 
 
Category 
Non-Student 
Participants 
n (%) 
Student 
Participants 
n (%) 
Total 
Gender    
Male 292 (38.8%) 98 (21.4%) 390 
Female 460 (61.2%) 360 (78.6%) 820 
Race    
White 605 (80%) 277 (60.2%) 882 
Black 44 (5.8%) 157 (34.1%) 201 
Hispanic or Latino 41 (5.4%) 8 (1.7%) 49 
Asian 42 (5.6%) 7 (1.5%) 49 
Other 24 (3.2%) 11 (2.4%) 35 
Age    
Under 21 61 (8.1%) 377 (82.5%) 438 
21 – 30 282 (37.3%) 60 (13.1%) 342 
31 – 40 184 (24.3%) 13 (2.8%) 197 
41 – 50 114 (15.1%) 5 (1.1%) 119 
Over 50 116 (15.3%) 2 (0.4%) 118 
Annual Family Income    
Under 20,000 144 (19.5%) 87 (21.1%) 231 
20,000 – 60,000 361 (49%) 149 (36.1%) 510 
Over 60,000 232 (31.5%) 177 (42.9%) 409 
Education Level    
Middle School or 
Lower 
1 (0.1%) - 1 
Some High School 10 (1.3%) - 10 
HS Diploma or GED 63 (8.3%) - 63 
Some College 208 (27.4%) - 208 
Associate’s Degree 71 (9.3%) - 71 
Bachelor’s Degree 270 (35.6%) - 270 
Master’s Degree 94 (12.4%) - 94 
Doctoral Degree 13 (1.7%) - 13 
Professional Degree 13 (1.7%) - 13 
Other 15 (2.0%) - 15 
College Status    
Freshman - 195 (42.6%) 195 
Sophomore - 109 (23.8%) 109 
Junior - 84 (18.3%) 84 
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Table 1 (continued). 
 
Senior - 66 (14.4%) 66 
Other - 4 (0.9%) 4 
U.S. Region of 
Residence 
   
Northeast 144 (19.1%) - 144 
Midwest 184 (24.4%) - 184 
South 271 (36.0%) - 271 
West 154 (20.5%) - 154 
Relationship Status    
Single or  
Never Married 
212 (28.2%) 293 (63.8%) 505 
In a Committed 
Relationship 
182 (24.3%) 142 (30.9%) 324 
Engaged, Married, or 
Partnered 
289 (38.5%) 18 (3.9%) 307 
Divorced or  
Separated 
59 (7.9%) 6 (1.3%) 65 
Widowed 9 (1.2%) 0 9 
Self-Identified Political 
Conservatism 
   
Liberal 374 (49.5%) 115 (25.0%) 489 
Moderate 180 (23.8%) 134 (29.1%) 314 
Conservative 184 (24.4%) 135 (29.3%) 319 
Unsure 17 (2.3%) 76 (16.5%) 93 
Religion    
Christian or  
Protestant 
221 (29.3%) 295 (64.1%) 516 
Catholic 120 (15.9%) 67 (14.6%) 187 
Jewish 10 (1.3%) 1 (0.2%) 11 
Buddhism 11 (1.5%) 3 (0.6%) 14 
Hinduism 8 (1.1%) 0 8 
Muslim 8 (1.1%) 0 8 
None 308 (40.8%) 49 (10.7%) 357 
Other 68 (9.0%) 45 (9.8%) 113 
 
Note.  Percentages in parentheses reflect the percent of cases for that sample in each demographic category.  All participants who were 
excluded from the study due to inattentiveness are not included in this table.  U.S. Region of Residence, College Status, and Level of 
Education data were not collected from both samples. 
 
participants obtaining at least some college education and 53.43% of participants 
obtaining a Bachelor’s Degree or higher.  More non-student participants reported that 
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they resided in the states of California (n = 64, 8.5%), Florida (n = 59, 7.8%), 
Pennsylvania (n = 49, 6.5%), Texas (n = 48, 6.4%), and New York (n = 42, 5.6%) than 
the other states.  However, except for Vermont, at least one participant reported that they 
resided in each of the other 50 states.  With the exception of Washington, D.C. (n = 3), no 
non-student participant resided in any U.S. territory.  
  To determine what demographic categories may be not accurately represented in 
the non-student sample compared to the American population, several demographic 
details of the American population were obtained from the 2010 United States Census 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2013).  Compared to the American population, the non-student 
sample appears to have higher amounts of female participants and White participants.  
Conversely, male participants, Black participants, and Latino participants appear to be 
under-represented in the non-student sample.  Moreover, the median age of the non-
student sample (31.0 years) is slightly lower than the median age of the American 
population (37.2 years).  Finally, the proportion of non-student participants residing in 
the four regions of the United States appears similar to the census findings: all 
proportions from the current study are within ±3% of the proportion of the American 
population living in the four regions.  See Table 2 for this comparison. 
Finally, a series of independent samples t-tests and chi-square tests of 
independence were utilized to identify any differences between the student and non-
student datasets based on age, gender, race, and self-identified political conservatism.  
The findings of these analyses indicated several significant differences: the student 
participants were significantly younger (M = 20.61 years) than the non-student 
participants (M = 35.58 years, t(1057.9) = 29, p <. 001, r = 0.67).  Regarding gender, 
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there was a significant difference noted in the proportion of men and women (χ2(1) = 
39.60, p < .001); specifically, students were significantly less likely to be male (z = -4.1) 
and significantly more likely to be female (z = 2.8).  There was also a significant racial 
difference between the two samples (χ2(4) = 176.19, p < .001) with students significantly 
less likely to be White (z = -3.1) and more likely to be Black (z = 9.3).  Finally, a 
difference was found between these samples in terms of self-identified political 
conservatism (χ2(3) = 124.60, p < .001); more exactly, students were more likely to 
identify themselves as “Unsure” of their political orientation (z = 6.9) and less likely to 
identify themselves as “Liberal” (z = -5.2).   
Table 2 
 
Comparison of Gender, Race, Region of Residence, and Age between the Current Study’s 
Non-Student Participants and the 2010 U.S. Population 
Category Non-Student Sample U.S. Population 
Gender   
Male 38.8% 49.5% 
Female 61.2% 50.5% 
Race   
White 80.0% 72.4% 
Black 5.8% 12.6% 
Hispanic or Latino 5.4% 16.3% 
Asian 5.6% 4.8% 
Region of Residence   
Northeast 19.1% 17.9% 
Midwest 24.4% 21.7% 
South 36.0% 37.1% 
West 20.5% 23.3% 
Median Age (in years) 31.0 37.2 
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Measures 
 Demographic Questionnaire.  A form solicited basic demographic information 
from the participants, such as their age, gender, and race.  Additionally, basic questions 
were asked about the participant’s religious behaviors (e.g., church attendance, 
denominational affiliation), political preferences (e.g., self-identified level of 
conservatism, political party affiliation), and basic attitudes towards the death penalty 
(e.g., overall level of general support).  Self-identified level of political conservatism, in 
particular, was utilized as a covariate in several regression analyses.   Similar to many 
other studies on death penalty attitudes (e.g., Applegate et al., 2000; Britt, 1998; Unnever 
& Cullen, 2005; 2006; Wozniak & Lewis, 2010), political conservatism was measured by 
each participants’ response to a single item: “Here's a seven point scale on which the 
political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely 
conservative.  Where would you place yourself on this scale?”  Participant responses 
ranged from a “1” (Extremely Liberal) to a “7” (Extremely Conservative).  Participants 
were also given an option to respond “I don’t know” for this item; those who selected this 
response option were removed from some analyses (see below). 
 Revised Attitudes Toward the Death Penalty Scale (RATDP).  The Attitudes 
Toward the Death Penalty Scale (ATDP; Hingula & Wrightsman, 2002) was developed 
to measure level of support for capital punishment.  The original ATDP is a 23-item 
measure in which participants are asked to indicate their level of agreement with each 
item, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  Total scores on the 23-item ATDP 
can range from 23-115, with higher scores indicative of a higher level of support for the 
death penalty.  When it was originally developed, the ATDP was not assessed for its 
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psychometric properties (e.g., factor structure, reliability, validity).  However, subsequent 
studies have found support for adequate levels of internal consistency: α = .85 (Bloechl, 
Vitacco, Neuman, & Erikson, 2007; Whited et al., 2014), α = .88 (Mandracchia, Shaw, & 
Morgan, 2013).  In a previous study (i.e., Whited et al., 2014), the researchers examined 
the psychometric properties of the ATDP in exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses 
in order to investigate the notion that death penalty attitudes are a multifaceted construct.   
In the first part of Whited et al.’s (2014) study, data from 307 undergraduate 
students were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis (i.e., principal factor analysis 
extraction method, oblique rotation method).  After preliminary analyses to determine the 
number of factors that should be retained, the five-factor model was found to be the most 
interpretable and explained the greatest total variance (39%), so it was retained.  
Following item deletion procedures using a minimum factor loading cutoff of 0.32, a 
total of 16 items were retained.  In the final analysis constrained to five factors and 16 
items, sampling adequacy was classified as great (KMO = .838; Hutchenson & 
Sofroniou, 1999) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ² (120) = 1301.45, p < 
.001).  The 16-item five-factor model explained 44.3% of the total variance.  The factors 
and items of the 16-item ATDP can be found in Appendix G. 
Factor 1 was labeled Sentencing Disputes, accounted for 25.0% of total variance, 
and included four items regarding issues involved in death penalty sentencing (e.g., 
number of permitted appeals, life imprisonment, length of time before execution).  Factor 
2 was labeled Sanction Exceptions, accounted for 8.8% of total variance, and consisted of 
four items concerning types of defendants (e.g., cognitively impaired defendants, 
pregnant defendants) or situations (e.g., existence of doubt about the defendant’s guilt) 
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that may be exempt from receiving the death penalty.  Factor 3 was labeled Crime 
Control, accounted for 4.3% of total variance, and included three items concerning the 
ability of the death penalty to function as a deterrent for future crimes.  Factor 4 was 
labeled Opposition Concerns, accounted for 3.4% of total variance, and consisted of three 
items reflecting common rationales used by opponents of capital punishment to justify 
their stance (e.g., sanction devalues life, brutalization effect).  Finally, factor 5 was 
labeled Gender Equality, accounted for 3.0% of total variance, and consisted of two items 
advocating for the equal dispersal of death penalty sentencing on men and women.  
Internal consistency was calculated for the full 16-item ATDP as well as the five factors 
extracted from the measure.  The total 16-item ATDP reliability coefficient was good (α 
= .81); however, the internal consistencies of each of the factors were fairly low (i.e., 
ranged from α = .58 to α = .79).  The low reliability from the ATDP factors highlighted a 
need to bolster several of the factors by adding or revising items in future research.   
In the second part of the study, Whited et al. (2014) analyzed a novel sample of 
adult undergraduate students using a confirmatory factor analysis in order to further 
explore the proposed 5-factor model of death penalty attitudes and identify other areas of 
the ATDP in need of further development.  The confirmatory factor analysis was 
conducted using maximum likelihood estimation.  Various fit indices were examined to 
determine the strength of the fit between the proposed five-factor model and the data.  
Specifically, the chi-square represented a poor fit (χ2 = 260.29; df = 94; p < .0001), the 
CFI suggested an adequate but marginal fit (.859), the NFI indicated a poor fit (.802), and 
the RMSEA indicated a reasonable fit (.072, 90% CI = .062-.083).  After examining the 
standardized regression weights, or factor loadings, of each individual item, two items 
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were also found to be poorly loaded onto their factors.  Given the relatively poor fit of the 
model as indicated by several fit indices, the researchers decided that further work in item 
development and factor identification was warranted prior to continuing confirmatory 
factor analysis procedures to respecify the model.  See Appendix G for the 16-item 
ATDP. 
In sum, the exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of the ATDP illuminated 
several limitations of the measure that needed to be addressed, including (a) poor internal 
consistency values of most factors in the model, (b) poor communality of several items, 
and (c) poor fit of the hypothesized five-factor model with the data.  Moreover, another 
concern and a major limitation of Whited et al.’s (2014) 16-item ATDP was that its item 
content was not inclusive of several salient themes and rationales discussed in death 
penalty literature.  To address these concerns, items identified as problematic (e.g., low 
communality with other factor items, skewed variability in participant responses, unclear 
wording) were revised, and additional items were developed for the RATDP for the 
purposes of the current study.  To identify important aspects of death penalty attitudes 
that were not included in the item content of the ATDP, an extensive review of death 
penalty literature was conducted for articles discussing salient rationales that seem to 
shape modern attitudes towards the death penalty (e.g., Baker, Lambert, & Jenkins, 2005; 
Ellsworth & Gross, 1994; Firment & Geiselman, 1997; Lambert, Clarke, & Lambert, 
2004; Radelet & Borg, 2000; O’Neil et al., 2004; Tyler & Weber, 1982; Vogel & Vogel, 
2003).  Additionally, a preliminary analysis using both quantitative and qualitative data 
collected in Whited et al.’s (2014) study was conducted to identify possible gaps in the 
ATDP item content.  More specifically, the participants in that study had been asked to 
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identify their top rationale for their general stance (i.e., support, unsure, oppose) on the 
death penalty.  Participants were able to select among five different options or provide 
their own rationale.   
Among the 505 participants who indicated that they were generally supportive of 
the usage of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder, 43.8% indicated that an 
item regarding retribution (“The death penalty fits the crime [i.e., ‘eye for an eye’]”) best 
characterized their top rationale, 22.4% endorsed an incapacitation item (“The death 
penalty permanently prevents the criminal from committing further crimes”), 13.7% 
endorsed a deterrence item (“The death penalty prevents others from committing similar 
crimes in the future”), 8.1% endorsed a law and order item (“The death penalty maintains 
order in society and prevents chaos”), 7.1% endorsed a cost item (“The death penalty is 
cheaper than incarcerating a person in prison for life”), and 5.0% provided an “other” 
explanation for their top rationale.  Those that selected “other” and provided qualitative 
explanations of their top rationale for death penalty support (n = 25) mostly indicated that 
they agreed with all or several of the five aforementioned rationales, wrote general 
statements of support for the death penalty without further elaboration (e.g., “[The death 
penalty] is a necessity”), or wrote explanations related to retribution (e.g., “eye for an 
eye”) or incapacitation (e.g., “keeps murderers from killing again”).  Two unique 
participant rationales included a statement in support of the discretionary usage of the 
death penalty for heinous crimes as well as a statement regarding the victim’s family (i.e., 
“The death penalty gives the families of victims a peace of mind…”).  
When asked to identify their primary rationale for opposing the usage of the death 
penalty for persons convicted of murder (n = 224), 36.6% of the self-identified death 
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penalty opponents cited moral/religious reasons (“The death penalty is immoral and/or 
goes against my religious convictions”), 22.3% reported a primary concern over the 
execution of an innocent (“The death penalty is irreversible; an innocent person could be 
executed”), 18.8% chose an item regarding the brutalization effect (“The death penalty 
continues the cycle of violence”), 8.5% identified an item regarding rehabilitation (“The 
death penalty does not allow a convicted criminal the chance for rehabilitation”), 2.7% 
cited concerns about cost (“The death penalty is more costly than incarcerating a person 
in prison for life”), 0.9% endorsed an item regarding unfair administration (“The death 
penalty is unfairly dispersed to minorities and the impoverished”), and 10.3% provided 
an “other” rationale to explain their stance.  Death penalty opponents that selected 
“other” and provided qualitative explanations of their top rationale for death penalty 
opposition (n = 23) mostly indicated that they viewed the death penalty as an easier 
sentence than life without parole (e.g., “being sentenced to death for a horrible crime is 
too easy of a punishment”), agreed with several of the 5 aforementioned rationales, or 
wrote general opposition statements about capital punishment without further elaboration 
(e.g., “We do not have the right to take a life…”).  Other novel participant rationales 
included a statement about religious beliefs (i.e., “my religion is against killing”) as well 
as a statement regarding the mental health of the offender (i.e., “the majority of people in 
jail have a mental illness that they have no control over what caused them to commit the 
crime…”).  
Finally, those participants who indicated that they were “unsure” of their position 
on the death penalty (n = 229) were also given an opportunity to provide a statement 
explaining their current stance.  Unfortunately, examining the responses from this group 
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was essentially unhelpful in illuminating rationales that could be added to the measure.  
The vast majority of “unsure” participants reported feeling indifferent or being 
unknowledgeable about the subject area, preferred not to explain their reasoning behind 
their stance, or described a desire for the discretionary application of the death penalty 
depending on the aggravating and/or mitigating factors of the case.  Other participants 
described feeling conflicted or ambivalent about supporting capital punishment due to 
difficulties reconciling retributive desires and religious beliefs (“My religious beliefs say 
don’t kill someone for killing someone, but I’m southern and in the South we believe you 
get what you deserve…”). 
This preliminary analysis, as well as a review of relevant literature, highlighted 
several rationales used by death penalty opponents, proponents, and the “unsure” that 
were not included in the ATDP.  In particular, there were no items in the ATDP 
concerning retribution (the highest reported top rationale of proponents), incapacitation, 
the morality of the death penalty (the highest reported top rationale of opponents), the 
execution of an innocent defendant, the cost of the death penalty in comparison to life 
without parole, or the unfair administration of the death penalty to minorities.  As such, 
items were developed reflecting each of these subject areas for the RATDP.  Although 
there were already items regarding deterrence and maintaining law and order in the 16-
item ATDP (i.e., items within the Crime Control factor), additional deterrence and 
incapacitation items were added to the RATDP item pool with the hope of strengthening 
the internal consistency of the factor.  An additional item concerning the feasibility of life 
imprisonment without parole was similarly added to the item pool to potentially 
strengthen the internal consistency of the Judicial Disputes factor.  Moreover, given the 
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recent increase of discussion about the treatment of juvenile offenders and offenders with 
a serious mental illness in the literature and media, items were added regarding the 
execution of juvenile offenders and the execution of those diagnosed with a severe 
mental illness.  Finally, several additional items were included in the RATDP that were 
based on the aforementioned qualitative responses (e.g., items suggesting that the death 
penalty is an “easy way out,” items regarding providing the victim’s family with a sense 
of closure, and items measuring general support of the death penalty). 
In total, five items were revised and 24 novel items were added to the 16-item 
ATDP to create the 40-item RATDP.  The RATDP items are located in Appendix F.  
Similar to the ATDP, participants who completed the RATDP in the current study 
indicated their level of agreement to each item from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree); reverse coded items will be scored on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 
(strongly disagree). 
 Death Penalty Scale (DPS).  The DPS (O’Neil et al., 2004) is a 15-item, 5-factor 
scale that was developed over the course of 11 distinct studies (see O’Neil et al., 2004). 
The DPS is a self-report measure designed to quantify an individual’s level of support for 
the use of capital punishment.  Respondents answer each item on a 9-point Likert-type 
scale from “1” (strongly disagree) to “9” (strongly agree).  There is no total scale score 
for the DPS; however, scores are provided for each of the five subscales.  Subscale scores 
have various ranges (lowest range is 2-18 [Life Without Parole Allows Parole], highest 
range is 4-36 [General Support, Retribution and Revenge]), depending on the number of 
items within each particular subscale. 
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The five subscales of the DPS include: (1) General Support – higher scores 
indicate general support of the usage of the death penalty (e.g., “I think the death penalty 
is necessary”), (2) Retribution and Revenge – higher scores indicate support for the death 
penalty due to personal or societal retributive reasons (e.g., “The desire for revenge is a 
legitimate reason for favoring the death penalty”), (3) Death Penalty is a Deterrent – 
higher scores indicate belief that the death penalty acts as a general deterrent (e.g., 
“Executing a person for premeditated murder discourages others from committing that 
crime in the future”), (4) Death Penalty is Cheaper – higher scores indicate belief that 
execution is less costly than life imprisonment without parole (e.g., “Executing a 
murderer is less expensive than keeping him in jail for the rest of his life”), and (5) Life 
Imprisonment without Parole Allows Parole – higher scores indicate belief that 
individuals who are sentenced with life imprisonment will eventually receive parole (e.g., 
“There is no such thing that truly means ‘life without parole’”).   
Support has been found for the 5-factor model of the DPS in student and non-
student samples through a series of sequential exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analyses (O’Neil et al., 2004).  Generally speaking, the internal consistencies of subscales 
appear strong (α = .87, .75, .85, .89, & .69, respectively).  The internal consistencies of 
subscales in the current study were similarly strong in the non-student sample (ranging 
from α = .74 - .90); however, the internal consistencies of the subscales in the student 
sample were much lower (ranging from α = .59 - .81) Support has been found for the 
convergent and divergent validity of each subscale (see O’Neil et al., 2004).  
Additionally, support was found for the predictive validity of the general support factor 
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(i.e., high general support factor scores predicted sentencing verdicts across 11 studies; 
mean total effect of .39).   
 Revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale (RRF).  The RRF (Altemeyer & 
Hunsberger, 2004) is a 12-item measure designed to assess the level to which an 
individual endorses attitudes supporting Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s (1992) 
abovementioned conceptualization of religious fundamentalism.  Participants are 
instructed to choose one of nine responses indicating their level of agreement to each 
item, ranging from very strongly agree to very strongly disagree.  Participants with a 
higher total score on the RRF (possible score range is 12 to 108) have endorsed a high 
level of agreement with religious fundamentalist beliefs.  Similar to its original version, 
Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2004) note that the scale is free of content specific to any one 
religion and is therefore able to measure religious fundamentalism in individuals from 
any religious or denominational background.  The scale appears to have excellent internal 
consistency (e.g., α =.91-.92; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004; α =.94; Hathcoat & 
Barnes, 2010) and support has been found for the scale’s construct validity, convergent 
validity (e.g., strong positive correlation with right-wing authoritarianism, frequency of 
church attendance, belief in creationism, religious ethnocentrism, dogmatism, and 
childhood religious emphasis), and discriminant validity (e.g., moderate negative 
correlation with doubts about religion) in samples of community adults and college 
students (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004).  The RRF’s internal consistency for the 
current study was excellent, for both non-students (α = .96) and students (α = .94). 
Heartland Forgiveness Scale (HFS).  The HFS (Thompson et al., 2005) is an 18 
item self-report measure of dispositional or trait forgiveness (i.e., one’s general and 
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enduring tendency to be forgiving).  Participants are given seven response options for 
each item, ranging from 1 (Almost Always False of Me) to 7 (Almost Always True of Me). 
There are three subscales of the HFS: HFS Self (i.e., measurement of one’s ability to 
forgive oneself for perceived transgressions), HFS Other (i.e., measurement of one’s 
ability to forgive others for perceived transgressions), and HFS Situation (i.e., 
measurement of one’s ability to forgive a situation outside of anyone’s control; e.g., 
“fate,” natural disaster, illness).  Each subscale score ranges from 6 to 42, with higher 
scores indicating higher levels of forgiving in the subscale domain.  Total HFS scores 
range from 18 to 126, with higher scores suggesting that a participant has higher levels of 
dispositional forgiveness.   
Regarding reliability, acceptable internal consistency has been indicated for the 
HFS total scores (ranging from α = .86-.87) and each of the subscales (i.e., HFS Self α = 
.72-.76, HFS Other α = .78-.81, HFS Situation α = .77-.82; Thompson et al., 2005).  Test-
retest reliability coefficients are also adequate across the HFS total score and HFS Self, 
Other, and Situation subscales (3 week interval = .83, .72, .73, & .77, respectively; 9 
month interval = .78, .69, .69, .68; Thompson et al., 2005).  Evidence has been found to 
support the measure’s convergent validity (e.g., strong correlation with other measures of 
forgiveness, cognitive flexibility, and positive affect) and discriminant validity (e.g., 
negative correlation with measures of negative affect, vengeance, hostile automatic 
thoughts, and trait anger).  Furthermore, Thompson et al. (2005) found that high 
dispositional forgiveness is associated with romantic relationship duration and predictive 
of other forgiveness behaviors (e.g., choosing to listen to more self-forgiving than self-
punitive statements, describing prior transgressions in more neutral or positive responses 
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than negative responses).  The HFS internal consistency for the current study was 
excellent, for both non-students (α = .90) and students (α = .86). 
Vengeance Scale (VS).  The VS (Stuckless & Goranson, 1992) is a uni-
dimensional self-report measure of attitudes toward “personal vengeful responses to 
perceived wrong” (Stuckless & Goranson, 1992, p. 37).  Participants choose between 
seven response options for each of the 20 items of the measure, from “strongly disagree” 
to “strongly agree.”  Ten of the 20-items are written in reverse direction (e.g., “It is 
always better to ‘turn the other cheek’”) and are reverse-scored.  Total scores can range 
from 0 to 140, with higher scores indicating a greater endorsement of favorable attitudes 
towards revenge or vengeance.   
Support has been found for the measure’s reliability, as evidenced by strong 
internal consistency scores across two studies during its development across both genders 
(α = 0.92, 0.92), males only (α = 0.93, 0.93), and females only (α = 0.90, 0.92).  During 
measure development, test-retest reliability after five weeks (r = 0.90) and mean inter-
item correlation were acceptable (.36; Stuckless & Goranson, 1992).  Evidence has been 
found to support the measure’s convergent validity (e.g., strong positive correlation with 
measure of trait anger), divergent validity (e.g., moderate negative correlation with 
measures of empathy), concurrent validity (e.g., strong positive correlation with seven 
hypothetical and two actual vengeful behaviors), and discriminant validity (e.g., negative 
correlations with four hypothetical helpful or positive reciprocity behaviors).  The VS 
internal consistency for the current study was excellent, for both non-students (α = .95) 
and students (α = .91). 
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Procedure 
 Participants were obtained through a convenience sampling approach and took 
approximately 30 minutes to complete the entire study.  Participants from the 
undergraduate student sample were enlisted via an online research system used by the 
Department of Psychology, Sona Systems, Ltd.  Once indicating their interest in serving 
as participants in the study, the prospective participants were linked to a research-based 
survey service (qualitrics.com) wherein they were administered an informed consent 
form (see Appendix I) and all remaining measures (i.e., demographics questionnaire, 
RADTP, DPS, RRF, HFS, & VS [see Appendices A-F]).  To control for order effects 
and/or fatigue, the order of measures following the demographics questionnaire was 
randomized.  Additionally, all politically and religiously themed demographic questions 
were not given to participants until after they completed the study measures to prevent 
the priming of their responses.  Student participants were given research credit in Sona 
for psychology courses for their participation in the study. 
Participants from the non-student sample were enlisted from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online marketplace that recruits individuals to complete 
tasks that require human intelligence in exchange for monetary compensation.  Previous 
research exploring the suitability of MTurk for social science research has demonstrated 
that workers on MTurk are more representative of the United States’ population in terms 
of gender, race, age, and education than participants from traditional university subject 
pools (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010).  Other studies have found that data 
obtained from MTurk workers are reliable, and the data quality is not impacted by the 
compensation amount (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012).  
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Given the population of interest for this study (i.e., U.S. adults), the survey was restricted 
to adult MTurk workers currently residing in the United States.  Following their 
indication of interest in completing the survey, prospective participants from MTurk were 
directed to the aforementioned research-based survey service (qualitrics.com) where they 
were informed about the study, asked to provide consent to participate in the study, and 
then (following their consent; see Appendix I) directed to complete the measures of the 
study (i.e., demographics questionnaire, RADTP, DPS, RRF, HFS, & VS [see 
Appendices A-F]).  Participants were compensated between $0.20 to $0.50 for their 
participation.   
Excluding Cases Based on Inattention. In order to facilitate the assortment of high 
quality data to analyze, two directed response items were inserted throughout the survey 
to detect random responding and inattention (e.g., “Select ‘strongly agree’ for this 
item.”).  It was assumed that participants who did not correctly answer these simple and 
easily-identifiable attentiveness items were not attending to the survey content or 
providing valid responses.  Therefore, data from the 163 student and 281 nonstudent 
participants who failed to correctly answer both of these items were excluded from the 
dataset and all analyses and did not receive compensation for their participation. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
1. What is the factor structure of the RATDP?  
Hypothesis 1A. Following an exploratory factor analysis, the RATDP will have a 
 multifaceted factor structure of death penalty attitudes in a sample of nonstudent 
 American adults. 
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Hypothesis 1B. Following a confirmatory factor analysis using novel data from a 
 nonstudent American adult sample, the resulting factor structure of the RATDP 
 will demonstrate a reasonably good fit with the model identified in the 
 exploratory factor analysis. 
Hypothesis 1C. Following a confirmatory factor analysis using a novel dataset 
 from a  college student sample, the resulting factor structure of the RATDP will 
 demonstrate a  reasonably good fit with the model identified in the exploratory 
 factor analysis.  
2. How does the RATDP correlate with another measure of death penalty attitudes? 
Hypothesis 2. The RATDP total score will demonstrate a low to moderate 
 correlation with each of the five subscales from the measure of death penalty 
 attitudes proposed by  O’Neil et al. (2004). 
3. Does forgiveness and/or revenge moderate the relationship between religious 
fundamentalism and level of support for the death penalty? 
Hypothesis 3A. After accounting for race and political conservatism, the 
 relationship between religious fundamentalism and level of support for the death 
 penalty will vary as a function of the participant’s level of forgiveness. 
Hypothesis 3B. After accounting for race and political conservatism, the 
 relationship between religious fundamentalism on level of support for the death 
 penalty will vary as a function of the participant’s level of revenge attitudes. 
4. Do the constructs of forgiveness and revenge predict level of support for the death 
penalty? 
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Hypothesis 4A. Above and beyond the effects of race and political conservatism, 
 forgiveness will be negatively associated with level of support for the death 
 penalty. 
Hypothesis 4B. Above and beyond the effects of race and political conservatism, 
 revenge will be positively associated with level of support for the death penalty.  
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Stage 1: Data Screening, Scoring, and Preliminary Analyses.  Raw data were 
cleaned and cases were removed from the non-student (MTurk) and student (Sona) 
datasets based on the aforementioned inattention criteria.  Total and scale scores for each 
measure were calculated; ten non-student and student cases were chosen at random and 
also hand-scored to identify any potential problems with the computer scoring.  No 
problems were identified.   
Given that the RATDP initially had 40 items, data from approximately 400 non-
student participants was needed to conduct the exploratory factor analysis.  This sample 
size was based on recommendations of gathering 5 to 10 participants per item (Clark & 
Watson, 1995; Floyd & Widaman, 1995).  Therefore, following item scoring procedures, 
401 non-student cases (i.e., 400 cases with no missing data, see below) were randomly 
selected and pulled from the non-student dataset to be used in the exploratory factory 
analysis of the RATDP (see Stage 2 below).  The remaining 357 non-student cases were 
assigned to be utilized in the initial confirmatory factor analysis of the RATDP (see Stage 
3 below).  Descriptive statistics (i.e., means & standard deviations) for the RATDP total 
and subscale scores (based on the 5 factor-model explicated below, see Stage 3), RRF, 
HFS, DPS subscale scores, and VS are provided in Table 3.   
Several independent t-tests were also used to determine if there were significant 
mean differences between the non-student and student samples on each measure used in 
the analyses (see Table 3).  The significant findings of these analyses indicated that,  
51 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Comparison of Means for Measures in Non-Student and Student Samples 
Category Means (SD) 
 Non-Student Student 
RATDP Total Score 47.49 (14.29) 48.77 (9.72) 
Abolitionist Arguments 18.62 (6.41)*** 16.95 (4.76) 
Innocence Concerns 4.93 (2.02) 5.62 (1.96)*** 
LI Viability 5.71 (1.89) 6.43 (1.53)*** 
Support Statements 11.54 (4.58) 12.57 (3.40)*** 
Sanction Exceptions 6.70 (3.09) 7.22 (2.44)** 
RRF Total Scores 43.64 (27.53) 68.61 (24.47)*** 
HFS Total Scores 84.34 (16.25) 86.57 (14.79)* 
VS Total Scores 62.19 (21.39) 60.16 (18.65) 
General Support (DPS) 20.27 (9.80) 19.82 (8.01) 
Retribution & Revenge 
(DPS) 
17.34 (8.02) 16.91 (6.84) 
DP is a Deterrent (DPS) 13.27 (7.11) 14.69 (5.42)*** 
DP is Cheaper (DPS) 11.39 (5.27) 11.44 (4.18) 
LWOP Allows Parole 
(DPS) 
8.48 (4.21) 9.37 (3.40)*** 
   
N 757 459 
 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  The presence of one or more asterisk(s) indicates a significant difference on the mean score 
between the non-student and student samples.  For example, the three asterisks on the abolitionist arguments mean score for non-
students indicates that the abolitionist arguments score was significantly higher, at the p < .001 level, for non-students than students.  
RATDP = Revised Attitudes Towards the Death Penalty Scale; LI Viability = Life Imprisonment Viability; RRF = Revised Religious 
Fundamentalism Scale; HFS = Heartland Forgiveness Scale; VS = Vengeance Scale; DPS = O’Neil et al.’s (2004) Death Penalty 
Scale. 
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compared to the non-student sample, the student sample had higher religious 
fundamentalism scores, higher dispositional forgiveness scores, supported abolitionist 
arguments and deterrence/pro-death penalty arguments (on the RATDP and DPS) to a 
greater extent, supported innocence concerns to a lesser extent, and viewed life 
imprisonment without parole as a less viable alternative to the death penalty.  The non-
student and student samples did not significantly differ on their general level of support 
for the death penalty, as measured by either the RATDP total score or the DPS General 
Support subscale score.  On average, the non-student sample supported the death penalty, 
as measured by the RATDP total score (mean of 47.49, with a midpoint of 45) and DPS 
General Support subscale score (mean of 20.27, with a midpoint of 20).  However, the 
student sample, on average, supported the death penalty, as measured by the RATDP 
(mean of 48.77), but not as measured by the DPS General Support subscale (mean of 
19.82). 
 Finally, a series of bivariate correlations were calculated to examine the 
relationships among the study variables for the non-student and student samples (see 
Table 4).  Of all other measures, the RATDP total scores had the highest correlation with 
the VS total scores (revenge) for the non-student and student samples (r = .369; r = .334, 
respectively).  The VS total score (revenge) was also highly negatively correlated to the 
HFS total score (dispositional forgiveness) for both non-students (r = -.54) and students 
(r = -.51), a finding that is theoretically sound. 
Missing Data.  It was fairly uncommon for the non-student participants to leave 
items blank or report that they preferred to not answer an item.  Of the non-student 
sample utilized in the exploratory factor analysis (n = 401; Stage 2), data from one case 
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was removed because the participant left several RATDP items blank.  One participant 
from the remaining non-student sample utilized in the confirmatory factor analysis (n = 
357; Stage 3), was responsible for all missing data in that analysis.  This case was also 
removed from the analysis.  Finally, of the portion of the non-student sample utilized in 
the moderation (Stage 5) and supplemental regression (Stage 6) analyses (n = 357), up to 
10 of the participants (2.8%) had missing data on one or more values.  Given that these 
participants represented less than 5% of the total sample size, they were excluded from 
all analyses using list-wise deletion. 
Table 4 
 
Summary of Intercorrelations for the Total Scores of the Study Variables 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
1. RATDP -- -.134* .369*** .241*** 
2. HFS  -.125** -- -.540*** .163** 
3. VS .334*** -.507*** -- -.178** 
4. RRF .052 .167*** -.163*** -- 
 
Note. Intercorrelations for non-student participants (N = 356) are presented above the diagonal; intercorrelations for student 
participants (N = 460) are presented below the diagonal.  RATDP = 18-item Revised Attitudes Towards the Death Penalty Scale (see 
Stages 2 & 3 below for explanation of RATDP measure development); HFS = Heartland Forgiveness Scale; VS = Vengeance Scale; 
RRF = Revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale.  *p < .05.  **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 It was more common for the student participants to leave items blank.  In the 
confirmatory factor analysis of the RATDP utilizing the student data (Stage 3), 1 
participant of the 461 cases was responsible for all missing data.  This case was removed 
from the analysis.  In this same portion of the student sample (n = 460) utilized in the 
moderation (Stage 5) and supplemental regression (Stage 6) analyses, 80 participants 
(17.35%) had missing data on at least one variable.  Most of these participants (n = 76) 
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left the Political Conservatism item blank or indicated that they were unaware of where 
their political views fell on the conservatism spectrum.  Given the large number of 
participants with missing data, choosing a listwise deletion method could be problematic, 
particularly if the missing data are not missing completely at random (MCAR; Allison, 
2002; Enders, 2010).  Separate variance t-tests and Little’s MCAR test (Little, 1998) 
were utilized to determine if there were any notable patterns in the missing data of this 
sample (Little’s MCAR test: χ² (19) = 14.50, p = .75); they revealed that the missing data 
was MCAR.  Since the data was MCAR, missing data for the student sample for all 
analyses in Stages 5 and 6 was handled using listwise deletion.   
Primary Statistical Analyses 
Stage 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis on RATDP.  The first research question 
asks, “What is the factor structure of the Revised Attitudes Towards the Death Penalty 
Scale (RATDP)?  It was hypothesized that following an exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) of the RATDP, a multifaceted factor structure would be identified (Hypothesis 
1A).  To investigate the underlying factor structure of the RATDP, an EFA was 
conducted on a portion of the sample of non-student American adults (N = 400).  More 
specifically, a principal factor analysis was utilized for extraction because the purpose of 
the analysis was to estimate the underlying factors of the RATDP; an oblique rotation 
method was used based on the assumption that the resultant factors would be correlated.  
An initial factor analysis supported a five-factor model using Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and 
explained 63.41% of the variance (see Table 5 for the initial eigenvalues and explained 
variance for the unrotated factors).  Based on the points of inflexion, the initial scree plot 
appeared to support a three, four, or five factor model.  Both a parallel analysis (i.e., the 
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comparison of each eigenvalue with a randomly generated eigenvalue with the same 
characteristics; Horn, 1965) and minimum average partial (MAP) test (i.e., supports 
retaining the number of factors which minimizes the average partial correlations between 
the variables after removing the effect of the factors; Velicer, 1976) were also conducted 
as additional methods of identifying the number of factors to extract.  The parallel 
analysis (SPSS syntax created by O’Conner, 2000) supported a six-factor model; the 
MAP test, updated by Velicer, Eaton, and Fava (2000; SPSS syntax created by O’Conner, 
2000), supported a five-factor model.  Based on these findings, it appeared that the choice 
of factor solution was a four, five, or six-factor model. 
Subsequent analyses using identical extraction and rotation methods were 
conducted constraining the number of factors to three, four, five, and six factors.  The 
three-factor model appeared too simplistic and had factors that were hard to interpret so it 
was discarded.  The four, five, and six-factor models were more complex and the most 
interpretable.  When comparing these models, the six-factor model explained slightly 
more total variance (65.92%) than the five-factor (63.41%) or four-factor models 
(60.72%).  However, the five-factor model had a more reasonable interpretation (i.e., the 
factors were understandable, there was a more equal spread of items between the factors, 
and the items had higher loadings onto their respective factors) than the six-factor or 
four-factor models.  The five-factor model was retained given that it was (a) the most 
interpretable factor structure, (b) supported by the scree plot, MAP test, and Kaiser’s 
criterion of 1, and (c) more parsimonious than the six-factor model.   
Within the retained five factor model, further item deletion occurred for those 
items that either had a factor loading lower than .40 on their respective factor or loaded at 
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or above .40 on more than one factor.  The minimum factor loading of .40 was chosen 
based on recommendations by Stevens (2009) and Myers, Gamst, and Guarino (2013).  
After items that did not meet the factor loading requirements were successively removed 
after several iterations, a total of 26 items remained.   
Table 5 
Initial Eigenvalues and Explained Variance from a Primary Factor Analysis of the 
Revised Attitudes Towards the Death Penalty Scale (RATDP) 
Factor Eigenvalue % of variance Cumulative % 
1 18.14 45.36 45.36 
2 2.87 7.18 52.54 
3 2.01 5.03 57.56 
4 1.30 3.24 60.81 
5 1.07 2.69 63.49 
6 1.00 2.50 65.99 
 
Further analysis of the extent to which these 26 items related to one another 
revealed a problem: several items, particularly in the first factor, were so highly 
correlated (r < .8) that extreme multicollinearity was a concern.  For example, the item, 
“It is immoral for society to take a human life, no matter the circumstances,” loaded on 
factor 1; however, it was highly correlated with four other items that loaded onto factor 1.  
Extreme multicollinearity causes problems with interpreting the factors as it is impossible 
to distinguish the unique contributions of each highly correlated item on their respective 
factors (Field, 2009).  As such, a total of 8 additional items were removed that were 
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highly correlated (and conceptually very similar or identical) with other items.  For 
example, the item, “The possibility of being executed serves as a deterrent against 
committing violent crimes,” was removed from factor 4 due to its strong correlation and 
content similarity with the item, “Giving the death penalty to serial killers or murderers 
of horrific crimes is one method that the state can use to discourage future heinous 
murders.”  Removing these additional items generated an R-matrix determinant that was 
not indicative of multicollinearity. 
A final exploratory factor analysis, utilizing the 18 retained items, was conducted 
and constrained to five factors.  The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
(KMO) for the final analysis was classified as “superb” (KMO = .92; Hutcheson & 
Sofroniou, 1999), indicating that the sample size is large enough to provide a reliable 
factor analysis.  Moreover, Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, χ² (153) = 
4482.11, p < .001, indicating that inter-item correlations were large enough for the 
principal factor analysis.  The final 18 item, five-factor model of the RATDP explained 
74.29% of the total variance and supported Hypothesis 1A that proposes that death 
penalty attitudes are a multifaceted construct.  Table 6 shows item communalities and the 
pattern matrix for the five-factors of the RATDP Scale. 
Each of the factors from the five-factor model was labeled based on the apparent 
theme of its items.  Factor 1, labeled Abolitionist Arguments, is composed of 6 items 
concerning the rationales frequently endorsed by opponents of the death penalty, 
including more general statements of dissent (e.g., “No civilized society permits capital 
punishment”) as well as more specific reasons (e.g., brutalization effect, religious/moral 
beliefs).  An example item is “Being sentenced to death for a horrific crime is too easy  
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Table 6 
Item Communalities and Pattern Matrix of Factor Loadings for the Five-Factor Model of 
the RATDP 
Items 
Factor 
Communality 
1 2 3 4 5 
A murderer may “deserve” to die, 
but humans cannot objectively 
determine who should die because 
of our biases. 
 
.910 .099 -.035 -.091 .009 .754 
I believe that it is morally wrong to 
have the power to take anyone’s 
life, regardless of the reasoning or 
the suspected crime. 
 
.820 -.024 -.001 .022 -.067 .751 
The death penalty goes against my 
beliefs about the importance of 
forgiving others for their 
wrongdoings. 
 
.798 -.046 .009 -.021 -.012 .615 
Laws permitting the death penalty 
continue a harmful cycle by using 
violence to punish violence. 
.794 .005 .005 .046 -.057 .739 
No civilized society permits capital 
punishment. 
.712 .009 -.030 ..153 .023 .633 
Being sentenced to death for a 
horrific crime is too easy and quick 
of a punishment; a person who 
committed murder should be made 
to spend the rest of their life behind 
bars. 
 
.577 .030 .084 .093 -.034 .503 
One major disadvantage of the 
death penalty is the possibility that 
an innocent person may be 
executed. 
 
.037 .781 .076 .040 .047 .632 
If a defendant on death row wants a 
DNA test of evidence, the state 
should automatically grant it. 
 
.059 .675 .015 -.082 .009 .456 
If there is any doubt about a 
defendant’s guilt, he or she should 
not be executed. 
 
-.088 .418 -.081 .153 -.269 .356 
There is no sentence that truly 
means “life without parole;” unless 
an offender is put to death, they 
could always get out of prison one 
day. 
 
-.065 .031 .913 -.009 -.059 .838 
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Table 6 (continued). 
Those sentenced to life 
imprisonment usually get out on 
parole. 
 
.032 .016 .634 .051 -.023 .470 
Giving the death penalty to serial 
killers or murderers of horrific 
crimes is one method that the state 
can use to discourage future 
heinous murders. 
 
.038 -.002 .058 .844 .109 .717 
The only way to control some 
potential crime is to enforce the 
death penalty. 
 
..092 .071 .123 .756 .035 .774 
 “Eye for an eye” is the only way 
criminals will know that society is 
serious about protecting its citizens. 
 
.009 -.006 -.067 .733 -.157 .630 
Any person convicted of 
premeditated murder, no matter 
their race, gender, age, or level of 
income should be considered to 
receive the death penalty. 
 
.231 -.127 .171 .458 -.152 .631 
It is wrong to sentence a person 
diagnosed with mental retardation 
to death. 
 
.049 -.015 .100 .001 -.822 .793 
I am against the execution of a 
defendant who committed a crime 
when they were suffering from a 
severe mental illness, such as 
schizophrenia. 
 
.114 .050 .136 -.035 -.751 .793 
No matter the severity of the crime, 
any offender under the age of 18 
should not receive the death 
penalty. 
 
.212 .094 -.001 .123 -.491 .570 
 
Note. Factors include, in order: Abolitionist Arguments, Innocence Concerns, Life Imprisonment Viability, Support Statements, and 
Sanction Exceptions.  Items are sorted by size, with higher factor loadings within each respective factor presented first.  The highest 
factor loading for each item is bolded. 
 
and quick of a punishment; a person who committed murder should be made to spend the 
rest of their life behind bars.”  Factor 2, labeled Innocence Concerns, consists of 3 items 
that discuss the possibility of executing an innocent person or advocate for the use of 
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DNA testing if requested by the defendant.  An example item is, “If there is any doubt 
about a defendant’s guilt, he or she should not be executed.” 
Factor 3, labeled Life Imprisonment Viability, is composed of 2 items that suggest 
that a life imprisonment sentence is not a viable alternative to the death penalty.  An 
example item is, “Those sentenced to life imprisonment usually get out on parole.”  
Factor 4, labeled Support Statements, includes 4 items that reflect many of the rationales 
used by proponents of the death penalty to justify their stance (e.g., efficacy of sanction 
as a deterrent, utility of sanction to maintain law and order, societal retribution).  An 
example item is “‘Eye for an eye’ is the only way criminals will know that society is 
serious about protecting its citizens.”  Factor 5, labeled Sanction Exceptions, includes 3 
items concerning types of defendants that may be exempt from receiving a death sentence 
(e.g., cognitively impaired, those with a severe mental illness, juveniles).  An example 
item is “I am against the execution of a defendant who committed a crime when they 
were suffering from a severe mental illness, such as schizophrenia.” 
Stage 3: Confirmatory Factor Analyses on the RATDP.  Hypothesis 1B proposes 
that following a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using novel data from a nonstudent 
American adult sample, the resulting factor structure of the RATDP will demonstrate a 
reasonably good fit with the model identified in the previous EFA.  To test this 
hypothesis and further evaluate the factor structure of the RATDP, a CFA was conducted 
on a nonstudent American adult sample (i.e., the unexamined portion of data from the 
non-student sample; N = 356) using the statistical program Amos (Version 23.0.0).  More 
specifically, the five-factor model of the RATDP found in the abovementioned EFA was 
replicated in Amos.  The CFA was conducted using maximum likelihood estimation, a 
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commonly used estimation technique that estimates the values of the model parameters in 
such a way that results in the highest likelihood of a match between the proposed model 
and the data (Myers et al., 2013).   
In order to determine the goodness-of-fit between the proposed 5-factor model of 
the RATDP and the data, several fit indices were examined.  The CFA produced a 
significant chi-square statistic (χ2 = 279.15, df = 125, p < .001), which indicates that there 
is a significant difference between the saturated model (i.e., an unconstrained model that 
fits the data perfectly) and the proposed model.  Therefore, according to the chi-square 
test, the proposed model is a poor fit for the data.  However, many researchers have 
deemed the sole use of the chi-square test to determine model fit as problematic, 
particularly because it is overly sensitive to sample size (i.e., samples over 200 usually 
have too much statistical power and so the chi-square test may detect very trivial 
differences; Bentler, 1990; Joreskog & Sorbom, 1996) and large correlations in the model 
(Kenny, 2014).  As such, although the chi-square test indicated a poor fit of the model 
with the data, additional fit indices were examined. 
The other examined fit indices, including both absolute (CMIN/df, GFI, RMSEA) 
and a relative fit index (CFI), overwhelmingly indicated that the proposed five-factor 
model of the RATDP had a “good” or “acceptable” fit with the data.  For instance, 
dividing the chi-square value by the degrees of freedom (CMIN/df ) helps to balance the 
aforementioned problems with using the chi-square test with a large sample.  CMIN/df 
values that are less than 3 suggest a “good” fit and values between 3 and 5 are considered 
to suggest a “permissible” fit (Bollen & Curran, 2003).  The CMIN/df for the proposed 
model is 2.233, indicating a good fit.  The goodness of fit index (GFI) provides a value 
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that reflects the proportion of variance in the sample correlation/covariance for which the 
proposed model accounts.  GFI values range from 0 (no fit) to 1 (perfect fit); values 
greater than .90 are indicative of an acceptable model (Myers et al., 2013).  With these 
cutoffs, the GFI value of .921 indicates that the hypothesized model is acceptable. 
A widely utilized absolute fit index is the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA).  The RMSEA reflects the degree to which a lack of fit is 
present based on the chi-square value, the degrees of freedom, and the sample size.  
Although it uses the chi-square value, RMSEA’s inclusion of the estimated error of the 
population permits it to be relatively independent of sample size, and it is therefore 
viewed as a less-biased fit indicator.  There appear to be many different guidelines for the 
interpretation of RMSEA; however, generally speaking, values of less than .01 indicate 
excellent fit, values between .01 and .05 indicate good fit, values between .05 and .08 
indicate an acceptable or reasonable fit, values between .08 and .10 indicate questionable 
fit, and values greater than .10 indicate unacceptable fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; 
MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996).  The hypothesized five-factor model generated 
a RMSEA of .059 (90% CI = .050-.068), indicating an acceptable fit of the proposed 
model with the data. 
Besides the absolute fit indices, one relative fit index was examined.  Relative fit 
indices compare the null or independence model (i.e., the worst possible model for the 
data that assumes there are no relationships in the data) to the saturated model (i.e., the 
best fitting model for the data) to determine the fit of the hypothesized model, on a 
continuum from 0 (no fit) to 1 (perfect fit; Myers et al., 2013).  Generally speaking, 
values greater than .90 or .95 suggest an acceptable fit between the model and data.  The 
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comparative fit index (CFI), a commonly utilized relative fit index that adjusts for sample 
size, was .959, indicating a good fit (Byrne, 2001; Knight, Virdin, Ocampo, & Roosa, 
1994).   
To identify any poor-fitting items that may require removal from the model, the 
standardized regression weights, or factor loadings, of each item were examined.  None 
of the 18 items loaded poorly (i.e., had estimates less than .40) on their respective factors 
(see Table 7 for a list of the factor loadings); therefore, no paths were identified that 
necessitated removal from the model.  In order to illuminate other potential model 
alterations, or respecifications, the modification indices were examined.  The 
modification indices included several recommendations for adding correlations and paths 
to the model, but none of these suggestions made theoretical sense or would greatly 
improve the fit of the model.  As such, the five-factor model was not respecified in any 
way; the underlying factor structure and item content resultant from the aforementioned 
EFA was retained. 
In sum, the chi-square test was the only fit index that indicated that the model had 
a poor fit with the data, with the other absolute and all relative fit indices suggesting an 
acceptable-to-good fit of the proposed model with the data.  Relying on the chi-square 
test as an indicator of model fit is problematic for the current study, particularly because 
of the large sample size.  Furthermore, an examination of the factor loadings of the items 
and modification indices did not reveal any necessary changes for the model.  In light of 
the reasonably good fit of the five-factor model of the RATDP in a sample of nonstudent 
American adults, demonstrated by a variety of absolute and relative fit measures, 
Hypothesis 1B was supported.   
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Hypothesis 1C states that following a CFA using a novel dataset from a college 
student sample, the resulting factor structure of the RATDP will demonstrate a 
reasonably good fit with the five-factor model identified earlier in the EFA.  Similar to 
the CFA conducted on the nonstudent sample, this analysis was conducted in Amos 
(Version 23.0.0) using maximum likelihood estimation (N = 460).  Several fit indices 
were examined to determine the level of fit between the proposed five-factor model and 
the data.  The chi-square test was significant (χ2 =313.34, df = 125, p < .001), indicating 
that the proposed model is a poor fit for the data.  However, in light of the previously 
cited concerns about using the chi-square test with large sample sizes, the fit of the five-
factor model was largely determined using other fit indices. 
Besides the chi-square test, all other absolute fit indices indicated good or 
adequate fit.  The CMIN/df was 2.51, which is below the cutoff of 3, indicating a good fit 
of the model with the data (Bollen & Curran, 2003).  The GFI was also examined; based 
on the earlier mentioned cutoff of .90, the GFI value of .928 indicates that the proposed 
model is acceptable (Myers et al., 2013).  The last absolute fit index that was examined 
was the RMSEA.  The RMSEA value for this analysis was .057 (90% CI = .049-.065), 
indicating an acceptable fit of the hypothesized model with the data (Browne & Cudeck, 
1993; MacCallum et al., 1996).  Finally, the CFI, a commonly used relative fit index, was 
examined.  The CFI value for the current model was .921, indicating a good fit using the 
guidelines explicated above (Byrne, 2001; Knight, Virdin, Ocampo, & Roosa, 1994).   
Next, standardized regression weights (i.e., factor loadings) of each item and the possible 
modification indices were examined to determine if the model could be improved by item 
deletion, the removal or addition of a correlation, and/or the removal or addition of a  
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Table 7 
Completely Standardized Loadings of Items on Factors for Non-Student and Student 
Samples 
Item 
Abolitionist 
Arguments 
Innocence 
Concerns 
LI Viability 
Support 
Statements 
Sanction 
Exceptions 
 N-S S N-S S N-S S N-S S N-S S 
Deserve .849 .718         
Morally 
Wrong 
.895 .820         
Forgiving .730 .746         
Harmful 
Cycle 
.866 .687         
Civilized .808 .478         
Too Easy .658 .506         
Innocent 
Person 
  .722 .735       
DNA Test   .658 .681       
Doubt   .659 .446       
No Sentence     .777 .563     
Life      .680 .671     
Discourage        .802 .687   
Control       .856 .795   
Eye for an 
Eye 
      .791 .466   
Any Person       .748 .707   
Mental 
Retardation 
        .876 .717 
Mental Illness         .834 .693 
Age of 18         .725 .510 
 
Note.  Non-student sample loadings are presented in the N-S columns; Student sample loadings are presented in the S columns.  Items 
are labeled by keyword for identification, but appear in the same order as in Table 6.  All loadings are significant (p < .001).  LI 
Viability = Life Imprisonment Viability. 
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path.  Reviewing the standardized regression weights revealed no items eligible for 
deletion from the model: all factor loadings loaded onto their respective factor at higher 
than the .40 level.  Any potential changes to the model suggested in the modification 
indices were not viable as they did not make theoretical sense and/or would not 
significantly improve the fit of the model.  Overall, similar to the results of the CFA with 
the nonstudent sample, all fit indices, with the exception of the chi-square test, indicated 
that the proposed five-factor model appears to have an acceptable or good fit  
with the data.  Therefore, Hypothesis 1C, proposing that the five-factor model of the 
RATDP would demonstrate a reasonably good fit in a sample of college students, was 
supported. 
All further analyses were conducted using the aforementioned five-factor model 
of the RATDP.  Total scores for the measure were calculated (i.e., RATDP total score) as 
well as each of the five factor scores (i.e., Abolitionist Arguments, Innocence Concerns, 
Life Imprisonment Viability, Support Statements, & Sanction Exceptions) by (a) reverse 
scoring all items in the Abolitionist Arguments, Innocence Concerns, and Sanction 
Exceptions factors, and (b) summing the score of the items for each respective factor 
(item scores can range from 1 to 5).  As such, the RATDP total score could range from 0 
to 90.  Similarly, ranges were calculated for each factor score (Abolitionist Arguments 
score range = 0-30; Innocence Concerns score range = 0-15; Life Imprisonment Viability 
score range = 0-10; Support Statements score range = 0-20; Sanction Exceptions score 
range = 0-15).  For the total score and each subscale scores on the RATDP, higher scores 
reflect higher levels of support for the death penalty or lower levels of support for anti-
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death penalty rationales.  The directions and items of the RATDP are equivalent to 
approximately a 9th to 10th grade reading level (i.e., Flesch-Kincaid grade level = 9.9). 
Measurement Model Invariance Testing.  Although the data from both college 
student and nonstudent samples appeared to fit well with the five-factor model of the 
RATDP in the CFAs, supplemental model invariance, or equivalence, analyses were 
conducted to determine if there were significant differences in the factor-structure or 
factor loadings between both samples. Invariance testing was examined in two steps, 
configural invariance (i.e., determined whether or not the factor structure of the RATDP 
fit both non-student and student groups when analyzed together and without constraints) 
and metric invariance testing (i.e., determined whether or not the magnitude of the 
loadings on each RATDP factor is similar across non-student and student groups; see 
Table 8 for review).  Amos software (Version 23.0.0) was utilized for both multi-group 
modeling procedures.  The configural invariance test provides goodness-of-fit indices 
that are interpreted to determine the fit of the multi-group model.  The current data 
evidence a reasonably well-fitting multi-group model (χ2 = 592.51, df = 250, p < .001; 
GFI = .925; RMSEA = .041, 90% CI = .037-.045; CFI = .944).  Specifically, this 
indicates that the five-factor model of the RATDP has an acceptable fit across the non-
student and student participants, suggesting configural invariance.   
In metric invariance testing, a series of constraints are placed on the model.  
Amos automatically places constraints, in a step-wise fashion, on the factor loadings, 
variance of the latent variables, and residual item variances of the model (see Table 8 for 
the differentiation between weak, strong, and strict metric invariance).  Each level of 
metric invariance is determined successively if a chi-square difference test on the χ2 
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values of the unconstrained and constrained models are not significant.  First, to 
determine if weak invariance testing was present in the multi-group model, the χ2 of the 
constrained model (in which factor loadings were constrained) was compared to the χ2 of 
the unconstrained model.  The constrained model produced a χ2 value of 666.26 (df = 
263, p < .001).  The chi-square difference test between the unconstrained and constrained 
models was significant (χ2 = 73.75, df = 13, p < .001), indicating that weak metric 
invariance is not present.  That is, the magnitude of the factor loadings differ between 
non-student and student participants.  Since weak metric invariance between students and 
non-student models was not supported, no additional metric invariance tests (e.g., strong, 
strict) were conducted.  In sum, although configural invariance of the non-student and 
student groups was found, given that the metric invariance of the model was not similarly 
supported, the remainder of the analyses (Stages 4 – 6) were conducted on both non-
student and student datasets separately. 
Table 8  
 
Invariance Testing Review 
 
Baseline 
Model  
Parameters Constrained to be 
Equal  
Δ χ2 Test Type of Invariance  
Configural  None -- Configural Invariance 
Metric 
Invariance 1 
Factor loadings Δ χ2 M1-M0 Weak Metric Invariance  
Metric 
Invariance 2 
Factor loadings and item 
intercepts 
Δ χ2 M2-M1 Strong Metric Invariance  
Metric 
Invariance 3 
Factor loadings, item intercepts, 
and residual item 
variances/covariances  
Δ χ2 M3-M2 Strict Metric Invariance  
 
Note.  Significance on the χ2 difference test when examining any level of metric invariance indicates that the constrained and 
unconstrained models are significantly difference, and therefore not invariant. 
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 RATDP Reliability.  Table 9 contains the reliability statistics for the total RATDP 
score as well as the five factors extracted from the measure for both students and 
nonstudents.  The internal consistencies for the RATDP total score were acceptable for 
both nonstudent and student participants (α = .93, α = .84, respectively).  Among the non-
student participants, reliability statistics for each of the factors were acceptable (ranging 
from α = .71 [Innocence Concerns] to α = .92 [Abolitionist Arguments]).  However, the 
internal consistencies of the five factors for students were fairly low (ranging from α = 
.59 [Life Imprisonment Viability] to α = .82 [Abolitionist Arguments]).   
Table 9 
Internal Consistency for the RATDP Total Score and Each of the Five Factors Extracted 
Factor Label 
No. of 
Items 
Internal Consistency (α) 
   Non-students Students 
1 Abolitionist Arguments 6 .92 .82 
2 Innocence Concerns 3 .71 .62 
3 Life Imprisonment Viability 2 .73 .59 
4 Support Statements 4 .88 .75 
5 Sanction Exceptions 3 .86 .65 
 RATDP Total Score 18 .93 .84 
 
Stage 4: Construct Validity of the RATDP.  Hypothesis 2 proposes that the 
RATDP total score will have at least a low to moderate positive correlation with another 
measure of death penalty attitudes, O’Neil and colleagues’ (2004) Death Penalty Scale.  
In order to investigate this, a series of Pearson correlation coefficients (r) were examined; 
the strength of each correlation was interpreted based on Cohen’s (1988) guidelines (i.e., 
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absolute value of coefficients ranging from 0 to .10 are uncorrelated, absolute value of 
coefficients from .10 to .30 represent a low correlation, absolute value of coefficients 
from .30 to .50 represent a medium correlation, and absolute value of coefficients .50 or 
higher represent a high correlation).   
 For both the non-student and student samples, the intercorrelations between the 
RATDP total and subscale scores were first examined (see Table 10 for the non-student 
sample and Table 11 for the student sample).  For the non-student sample (N = 356), the 
RATDP total score was highly correlated with each subscale score except Innocence 
Concerns, which represented a medium correlation (r = .47).  Among the subscales, 
Abolitionist Arguments and Support Statements were the most related (r = .80), followed 
by Support Statements and Sanction Exceptions (r = .63) and Abolitionist Arguments and 
Sanction Exceptions (r = .61).  All other relationships between the RATDP subscales 
reflected a low to medium correlation, with Innocence Concerns having the overall 
lowest correlations with the other RATDP subscales.  For the student sample (N = 460), 
the RATDP total score was highly correlated with the Abolitionist Arguments, Support 
Statements, and Sanction Exceptions subscale score (r = .84, r = .75, r = .72, 
respectively) and moderately correlated with Innocence Concerns and Life Imprisonment 
Viability (r = .46, r = .35, respectively).  No subscales were highly correlated with each 
other in the student sample and Innocence Concerns was uncorrelated with Life 
Imprisonment Viability and Support Statements.  Overall, when examining the 
intercorrelations of the RATDP total and subscale scores for non-students and students, it 
is apparent that the strength of the relationships in the non-student sample was greater 
than the student sample.  
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Table 10 
Correlations between RATDP Total and Factor Scores and DPS Factor Scores in a Non-
Student Sample 
 
 
RATDP 
Total Score 
Abol. 
Arguments 
Innocence 
Concerns 
LI 
Viability 
Support 
Statements 
Sanction 
Exceptions 
RATDP  
Total 
Score 
--      
Abol. 
Arguments 
.91*** --     
Innocence 
Concerns 
.47*** .24*** --    
LI 
Viability 
.50*** .30*** .20*** --   
Support 
Statements 
.91*** .80*** .28*** .41*** --  
Sanction 
Exceptions 
.80*** .61*** .47*** .33*** .63*** -- 
DPS 
General 
Support 
.89*** .88*** .28*** .34*** .85*** .63*** 
Retribution 
& Revenge 
.64*** .57*** .28*** .31*** .62*** .52*** 
DP Is a 
Deterrent 
.74*** .65*** .32*** .32*** .77 *** .52*** 
DP Is 
Cheaper 
.52*** .49*** .14*** .30*** .51*** .39*** 
LWOP 
Allows 
Parole 
.43*** .25*** .24*** .72*** .35*** .34*** 
 
Note.  N = 356. ***p < .001.  LI = Life Imprisonment; Abol. Arguments = Abolitionist Arguments; LWOP = Life Without Parole; DP 
= Death Penalty; RATDP = Revised Attitudes Towards the Death Penalty Scale; DPS = Death Penalty Scale, O’Neil et al. (2004). 
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Table 11 
Correlations between RATDP Total and Factor Scores and DPS Factor Scores in a 
Student Sample 
 
 
RATDP 
Total 
Score 
Abol. 
Arguments 
Innocence 
Concerns 
LI 
Viability 
Support 
Statements 
Sanction 
Exceptions 
RATDP  
Total Score --      
Abolitionist 
Arguments 
.84*** --     
Innocence 
Concerns 
.46*** .24*** --    
LI Viability .35*** .12** -.04 --   
Support 
Statements 
.75*** .48*** .08 .33*** --  
Sanction 
Exceptions 
.72*** .47*** .46*** .10* .37*** -- 
DPS 
General 
Support 
.77*** .77*** .14** .23*** .62*** .45*** 
Retribution 
& Revenge 
.44*** .35*** .16** .18*** .43*** .25*** 
DP Is a 
Deterrent 
.50*** .41*** .09* .20*** .52*** .26*** 
DP Is 
Cheaper 
.21*** .28*** -.18*** .16*** .20*** .03 
LWOP 
Allows 
Parole 
.33*** .25*** .07 .46*** .21*** .18*** 
 
Note.  N = 460. ***p < .001.  **p < .01. *p < .05.  LI = Life Imprisonment; LWOP = Life Without Parole; DP = Death Penalty; 
RATDP = Revised-Attitudes Towards the Death Penalty Scale; DPS = Death Penalty Scale, O’Neil et al. (2004). 
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The RATDP total score had at least a low correlation with all of O’Neil et al.’s 
(2004) DPS subscale scores in both the non-student and student samples.  In particular, 
the DPS General Support subscale, a measure of one’s overall level of support for capital 
punishment, was highly positively correlated with the RATDP total score for non-
students (r = .89) and students (r = .77).  These findings support Hypothesis 2 and 
provide initial support for the validity of the RATDP total score as a measure of level of 
support for the death penalty.   
Additional relationships were examined between the RATDP factors and DPS 
subscales based on similar item content.  Abolitionist Arguments (note that higher scores 
in this factor represent higher levels of disagreement with anti-death penalty rationales) 
was highly positively correlated with general support in both non-student (r = .88) and 
student (r = .77) samples.  Support Statements, a factor of the RATDP that includes items 
regarding deterrence and society’s use of retribution to maintain control, was highly 
correlated with the DPS subscale “Death Penalty is a Deterrent” in both nonstudent (r = 
.77) and student (r = .52) samples and was at least moderately correlated with the DPS 
subscale “Retribution and Revenge” in both samples.  
Moreover, Life Imprisonment Viability (note that higher scores in this factor 
represent higher disagreement with the use of a life imprisonment sentence instead of a 
death sentence) was highly correlated with the DPS subscale “Life Without Parole 
Allows Parole” in the non-student sample (r = .72) and moderately correlated with that 
subscale in the student sample (r = .46).  Finally, both Innocence Concerns (note that 
higher scores in this factor represent lower levels of concern about the possibility of 
executing an innocence) and Sanction Exceptions (note that higher scores in this factor 
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represent lower levels of concern about using the death penalty for juvenile, severely 
mentally ill, and/or cognitively impaired defendants) had mostly non-significant and low 
correlations with the DPS subscales.  These findings likely reflect the neglect of any 
mention of either subject in the DPS.   
Stage 5: Moderated multiple regression analyses.  Hypothesis 3A supposes that 
after accounting for covariates (i.e., self-identified political conservatism, race), 
forgiveness (as measured by the HFS total score) will moderate the relationship between 
religious fundamentalism (as measured by the RRF total score) and level of support for 
the death penalty (as measured by the RATDP total score).  Two sequential regression 
analyses were utilized to test this hypothesis in the non-student and student samples.  For 
both analyses, race, a categorical variable, was dummy-coded into two variables (i.e., 
White [Constant] vs. Black, White [Constant] vs. Other Races) and was entered in the 
first block along with political conservatism.  Moreover, total scores on the RRF and HFS 
were centered based on recommendations by Frazier, Tix, and Barron (2004); these 
scores were entered into the second block.  Finally, the interaction term (i.e., the product 
of the centered RRF [predictor] and HFS [moderator] total scores) was calculated and 
entered into the third block.   
 The assumptions for sequential regression (e.g., normality, multicollinearity, 
homoscedasticity, independent errors) were met for both non-student and student 
samples.  Influence statistics did not significantly skew the data for the non-student 
sample; however, four outliers were identified for the student sample and were removed.  
Table 12 displays the results of the moderation analyses for the non-student (N = 349) 
and student samples (N =377).  Note that a significant moderation effect is found when  
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Table 12 
Summary of Moderated Multiple Regression for Religious Fundamentalism and 
Forgiveness Predicting Level of Support for the Death Penalty in Non-Student and 
Student Samples 
 Non-students Students 
Predictor B R2 ΔR2 B R2 ΔR2 
Step 1  .111***   .040**  
Black Race 5.618   -.444   
Other Race 2.376   2.433   
Conservatism 3.003**   1.093**   
Step 2 (First-Order 
Effects) 
 .158 .047***  .067 .027** 
RRF .006*   .058**   
HFS  -.176***   -.076*   
Step 3 
(Interaction) 
 .161 .003  .067 .000 
RRF x HFS -.002   .000   
 
Note. *p < .05.  **p < .01. ***p < .001.  N = 349 for non-student sample; N = 377 for student sample.  RRF = Revised Religious 
Fundamentalism Scale; HFS = Heartland Forgiveness Scale.  
 
there is a significant R2 change coefficient when the interaction term is added into the 
model (Frazier et al., 2004).  For the non-student sample, the total model accounted for 
16.1% of the variance in level of support for the death penalty.  In the student sample, the 
total model accounted for a mere 6.7% of the variation in level of support for the death 
penalty.  For both samples, religious fundamentalism and forgiveness emerged as unique, 
significant predictors of level of death penalty support.  However, the third-step 
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interaction was not significant for either the non-student (ΔR2 = .003, p = .277, β = -.055) 
or the student sample (ΔR2 = .000, p = .962, β = .004).  This indicates that the relationship 
between religious fundamentalism and level of support for the death penalty are 
consistent across levels of forgiveness for both non-students and students.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3A is not supported. 
Hypothesis 3B posits that after accounting for covariates, revenge (as measured 
by the VS total score) will moderate the relationship between religious fundamentalism 
(as measured by the RRF total score) and level of support for the death penalty (as 
measured by the RATDP total score).  To test this hypothesis in a non-student and 
student sample, two sequential regression analyses were employed.  Race was dummy 
coded, the RRF and VS total scores were centered, and an interaction term was created 
(i.e., the product of the centered RRF [predictor] and HFS [moderator] total scores), and 
the variables were entered into each step in the same manner as discussed in the 
aforementioned moderation analyses.  Table 13 displays the findings of both of these 
analyses. 
The assumptions for sequential regression analysis were examined in both 
analyses; none were violated.  Examining the influence statistics led to the identification 
of 3 outliers in the non-student sample and 2 outliers in the student sample.  These cases 
were removed from the analyses.  For non-students (N = 344), the regression model 
accounted for 28.3% of the variation in the outcome variable, level of support for the 
death penalty.  In the student sample (N = 380), 16.4% of the variation in level of support 
for the death penalty were accounted for by the model.  First-order effects were found for 
both samples; specifically, both religious fundamentalism and revenge emerged as 
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unique, significant predictors of death penalty support among non-students and students.  
However, the third-step interaction was not significant for either the non-student (ΔR2 = 
.000, p = .899, β = .006) or the student sample (ΔR2 = .000, p = .946, β = .003).  This 
indicates that, for both non-students and students, the relationship between religious 
fundamentalism and level of support for the death penalty are consistent across levels of 
revenge.  Therefore, Hypothesis 3B is not supported. 
Table 13 
Summary of Moderated Multiple Regression for Religious Fundamentalism and Revenge 
Predicting Level of Support for the Death Penalty in Non-Student and Student Samples 
 Non-students Students 
Predictor B R2 ΔR2 B R2 ΔR2 
Step 1  .100***   .043**  
Black Race 2.814   -.571   
Other Race 2.359   1.376   
Conservatism 2.894***   1.208***   
Step 2 (First-
Order Effects) 
 .283 .183***  .164 .120*** 
RRF .106***   .071**   
VS  .273***   .169***   
Step 3 
(Interaction) 
 .283 .000  .164 .000 
RRF x VS .000   .000   
 
Note. *p < .05.  **p < .01. ***p < .001.  N = 344 for non-student sample; N = 380 for student sample.  RRF = Revised Religious 
Fundamentalism Scale; VS = Vengeance Scale. 
 
 Stage 6: Supplemental regression analyses.  In order to examine if the constructs 
of forgiveness and revenge predict level of support for the death penalty, two sequential 
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regression analyses were conducted.  It was hypothesized that after accounting for 
covariates, forgiveness would be negatively associated with level of support for the death 
penalty (Hypothesis 4A) and revenge would be positively associated with level of support 
for the death penalty (Hypothesis 4B) in both non-student and student samples.  For both 
analyses, the dependent variable was the level of support for the death penalty, as 
measured by the RATDP total score.  Political conservatism and race were entered into 
the first block of the analyses as control variables.  Race was recoded into two dummy 
variables, including White (Constant) vs. Black and White (Constant) vs. Other Races.  
Dispositional forgiveness, as measured by the HFS total score, and revenge, as measured 
by the VS total score, were entered into the second block as the predictor variables of the 
analyses. 
 The results of these regression analyses can be seen in Table 14.  The assumptions 
for sequential regression analyses were not violated.  Examination of the influence 
statistics revealed 3 outliers in the non-student sample; these were removed from the 
analyses.  No outliers were identified in the student sample.  For the non-student sample 
(N =344), the total model explained 27.4% of the variance in RATDP total scores (R2 = 
.274, F(5, 99) = 12.226, p < .001), with vengeance (β = .430, p < .001) emerging as the 
sole significant, unique predictor of level of support for the death penalty.  Forgiveness 
was not significantly predictive of level of support for the death penalty (β = .058, p = 
.307).   
For the student sample (N = 381), the total model explained 15.7% of the variance 
in RATDP total scores (R2 = .157, F(3, 375) = 26.83, p < .001), with vengeance (β = 
.390, p < .001) emerging as the sole significant, unique predictor of level of support for 
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the death penalty.  Similar to the non-student sample, forgiveness was not significantly 
predictive of level of support for the death penalty (β = .107, p = .054).  The collective 
findings from analyses using both non-student and student samples support Hypothesis 
4B; Hypothesis 4A was not supported. 
Table 14 
Summary of Sequential Regression Analyses for Forgiveness and Revenge Predicting 
Level of Support for the Death Penalty in Non-Student and Student Samples 
 Non-students Students 
Predictor β R2 ΔR2 β R2 ΔR2 
Step 1  .116***   .037**  
Black Race .296   -.024   
Other Race .182   .032   
Conservatism .339***   .181**   
Step 2  .274 .158***  .157 .121*** 
HFS .058   .107   
VS  .430***   .390***   
 
Note. *p < .05.  **p < .01. ***p < .001.  N = 344 for non-student sample; N = 381 for student sample.  HFS = Heartland Forgiveness 
Scale; VS = Vengeance Scale. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
Summary of Results 
Measuring Death Penalty Attitudes.  The first purpose of the current study was to 
continue the development of a revised, multi-item measure of death penalty support, the 
Revised Attitudes Towards the Death Penalty Scale (RATDP).  The need for such a 
measure is apparent when considering the lack of a psychometrically-sound way to 
examine one’s level of agreement with pro and anti-death penalty sentiments.  
Examination of the factor structure of a previously-developed measure, the 23-item 
Attitudes Towards the Death Penalty Scale (ATDP; Hingula & Wrightsman, 2002), in an 
earlier study suggested that death penalty attitudes are likely a multi-faceted construct 
(i.e., a 16-item, five-factor model on the ATDP was found after conducting an EFA; 
Whited et al., 2014); however, the limitations of that scale (i.e., low reliability statistics, 
poor fit of the factor structure, non-inclusion of several important death penalty 
rationales) warranted a substantial revision of the ATDP.  An initial step towards revising 
this measure included developing a preliminary 40-item version that was subjected to an 
EFA in the current study.  The findings of the EFA supported an 18-item, 5-factor model 
of the RATDP, a factor structure that was then replicated in separate CFAs utilizing data 
from non-student and student samples.   
Overall, the current investigation of the structure of the RATDP by means of 
factor analyses yielded five factors (i.e., Abolitionist Arguments, Innocence Concerns, 
Life Imprisonment Viability, Support Statements, and Sanction Exceptions) and 
supported the hypothesis that death penalty attitudes are multifaceted in nature 
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(Hypothesis 1A).  The hypotheses that the model of the RATDP found in the EFA would 
demonstrate good fit in CFAs using a non-student (Hypothesis 1B) and student 
(Hypothesis 1C) sample were also supported.  Abolitionist Arguments, the first identified 
factor, consisted of six distinct statements of opposition towards the death penalty, 
including both general statements (e.g., “No civilized society permits capital 
punishment”) as well as specific points of contention with the sentence (e.g., it is morally 
wrong, contributes to brutalization effect, is too easy and quick of a punishment, goes 
against importance of forgiving others).  Because each item in the factor is reverse 
scored, higher scores on Abolitionist Arguments reflect lower levels of support for 
common anti-death penalty sentiments.  The second factor, Innocence Concerns, 
measures one’s attitudes towards the possibility of executing an innocent person.  These 
items are also reverse-scored; therefore, higher scores on this factor reflects a lower level 
of concern about executing an innocent defendant, granting requests for DNA testing, or 
staying an execution if any doubt exists regarding a defendant’s guilt.   
Factor three, Life Imprisonment Viability, was comprised of statements 
measuring the extent to which one believes that a sentence of life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole is a viable alternative to a death sentence.  Higher scores on this 
factor reflect greater disagreement with the ability of a “life sentence” to completely 
incapacitate an offender for the remainder of his/her life.  Support Statements, the fourth 
factor, consisted of four distinct arguments utilized by proponents of the death penalty 
(e.g., deterrence, maintenance of control, societal retribution); those with higher scores on 
this factor have higher levels of agreement with pro-death penalty rationales.  Finally, 
Sanction Exceptions included types of defendants who may be exempt from receiving the 
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death penalty (e.g., the cognitively impaired, the severely mentally ill, and juveniles).  
Higher scores on this factor indicate higher levels of agreement with the execution of 
defendants with those characteristics.   
Invariance testing results indicated that the five-factor model fits both samples 
well (i.e., support was found for configural invariance); however, there was a significant 
difference in the magnitude of the item factor loadings between both samples (i.e., weak 
metric invariance was not supported).  In other words, the RATDP appears to measure a 
similar construct for both samples, but not the same construct.   Interestingly, both the 
student and non-student samples had similar levels of overall death penalty support, as 
measured by the RATDP total score and the DPS General Support subscale score.  
O’Neil and colleagues (2004) likewise found no significant difference in the DPS 
General Support subscale scores between their non-student and student samples. 
Although the non-student and student samples had similar levels of overall death 
penalty support (i.e., the RATDP total scores were not significantly different), many 
differences were found in the underlying factor scores between both samples.  More 
precisely, compared to the non-student sample, the student sample had significantly 
greater levels of agreement with anti-death penalty viewpoints (i.e., lower Abolitionist 
Arguments score) as well as pro-death penalty viewpoints (i.e., higher Support 
Statements score).  These findings could indicate that students generally tend to have 
extreme levels of agreement with pro and anti-death penalty rationales (resulting in a 
moderate level of support), whereas non-students generally tend to have milder levels of 
agreement with the arguments of both sides (producing a similarly moderate overall 
score).  Alternatively, these findings may suggest that these two samples have opposing 
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death penalty support “profiles;” that is, students may generally tend to agree equally 
with both opposing and favorable arguments about capital punishment, while non-
students may generally tend to disagree equally with the common arguments of both 
sides. Additionally, in the current study the student sample had significantly greater 
levels of disagreement with the innocence argument, the usage of life imprisonment as an 
alternate sentence to the death penalty, and the permitting of sanction exceptions (i.e., 
higher Innocence Concerns, Life Imprisonment Viability, and Sanction Exceptions 
scores, respectively), compared to the non-student sample.  This could indicate that, when 
matched against non-students, students are overall less aware or concerned with the 
nuances of the death penalty that pose problems for its administration.   
The differences in the underlying factors of death penalty attitudes noted between 
non-students and students could be due to differences in their cognitive processing states 
or traits; that is, how capital case decisions are made (e.g., the extent to which rational or 
experiential processes are utilized when considering evidence).  Previous research on 
non-capital legal decision making has shown that non-student samples (e.g., community 
adults, jury panelists) tend to make different sentencing verdicts, favor different forms of 
evidence, and use different decision-making processes when compared to a college 
student sample (Fox, Wingrove, & Pfeifer, 2011; Keller & Wiener, 2011; McCabe & 
Krauss, 2011; McCabe, Krauss, & Lieberman, 2010).  The extent to which these group 
differences apply to capital cases, however, is slightly less clear.  Miller, Wood, and 
Chomos (2014) reported some initial evidence to support differences between the 
cognitive processing states of non-student and student samples when considering general 
death penalty attitudes; however, they unfortunately utilized a single-item to measure 
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death penalty support.  Importantly, regardless of the reason why non-students and 
students may have had similar levels of overall death penalty support (i.e., RATDP total 
score) but significantly different levels of the underlying factors of death penalty attitudes 
(i.e., RATDP factor scores), these findings illustrate the notion that death penalty 
attitudes are multifaceted and are too complex to be accurately examined in a single item. 
Although the five-factor model of the RATDP was replicated in CFAs of both 
non-student and student samples, the initial empirical evidence supporting the 
psychometric properties of the RATDP appears stronger for the non-student sample.  
Specifically, in the non-student sample, all internal consistency coefficients for the 
RATDP total and factors are in an acceptable range (α = .71-.93).  In the student sample, 
the RATDP factor internal consistency values were lower (α = .59-.82), even though the 
RATDP total score value was acceptable (α = .84).  This indicates that the RATDP total 
scores have sufficient levels of reliability to be used in either sample; however, usage of 
RATDP factor scores should be limited to non-students until additional revisions are 
made that enhance the reliability of the factor scores with students.  Examination of the 
relationships between the RATDP total and factor scores and O’Neil et al.’s (2004) DPS 
factor scores in both non-students and students reveals initial evidence to support the 
convergent validity of the RATDP total score (Hypothesis 2).  Additionally, the moderate 
to high correlations found in both samples between theoretically-similar RATDP and 
DPS factors (i.e., Abolitionist Arguments and DPS General Support; Support Statements 
and DPS General Support; Life Imprisonment Viability and DPS LWOP Allows Parole; 
Support Statements and DPS DP is a Deterrent) also lends support for the convergent 
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validity of three RATDP factors: Abolitionist Arguments, Support Statements, and Life 
Imprisonment Viability.  
When comparing the RATDP with its predecessor (i.e., the 16-item ATDP; 
Whited et al., 2014), there are some notable similarities.  Both measures are of similar 
length and both have a five-factor model.  There were five items that remained unaltered 
between the ATDP and RATDP and two items that were only slightly revised.  There are 
also several similarities between the factors of both versions; for example, both the 
ATDP and RATDP have factors reflecting pro-death penalty and anti-death penalty 
arguments and both versions have a “Sanction Exceptions” factor.  Although there is 
some overlap between RATDP and ATDP, there are many indications which suggest that 
the RATDP is an improvement compared to its predecessor.  The RATDP total score as 
well as the majority of the RATDP factor scores for both non-students and students have 
better internal consistency values than the ATDP.  Several ATDP items had low 
communality and/or factor loadings, problems that do not exist with the RATDP for 
either sample.  Unlike the results of the CFA on the five-factor model of the ATDP, the 
RATDP’s five factor model was confirmed in both non-student and student samples.  
Finally, the RATDP’s item content emphasizes several salient death penalty rationales 
that were not part of the ATDP, including societal retribution, the morality of the 
sanction, the potential of executing an innocent person, the sentencing of juveniles and 
defendants with severe mental illnesses, and forgiveness. 
 Religious Fundamentalism, Forgiveness, and Revenge as Predictors of Death 
Penalty Support.  The second purpose of the current study was to further investigate the 
relationship between religious fundamentalism, forgiveness, and revenge.  It was 
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expected that forgiveness and revenge would separately moderate the relationship 
between religious fundamentalism and level of death penalty support (Hypotheses 3A 
and 3B); yet, these hypotheses were not supported for either the non-student or student 
samples.  In other words, the results from the current study suggest that the relationship 
between religious fundamentalism and death penalty support is consistent across levels of 
forgiveness and revenge.  No previous research has examined the ability of forgiveness or 
revenge to moderate the religious fundamentalism-death penalty support relationship.  
However, Unnever and Cullen (2006) found that affiliates of fundamentalist Christian 
denominations are more likely to possess retributive beliefs (e.g., viewing God as a harsh, 
punitive deity) and beliefs about the importance of forgiveness than affiliates of more 
liberal denominations.  They postulated that this conflicting belief system (e.g., 
possessing both retributive and forgiving beliefs) could create ambiguity and 
subsequently weaken fundamentalists’ level of support for the death penalty.   
The current study found no empirical support for Unnever and Cullen’s proposed 
relationship.  First and foremost, the failure to find a moderating effect of either 
forgiveness or revenge could indicate that these variables are not particularly meaningful 
in helping to understand the basis for a religious fundamentalist’s level of death penalty 
support.  It could also be, at least in part, because different strategies were used in the 
current study to measure all of the different variables (i.e., religious fundamentalism, 
forgiveness, retribution, death penalty support) than used by Unnever and Cullen.  Of 
particular note is the difference in how religious fundamentalism was operationalized 
between both studies: Unnever and Cullen used affiliation with a Christian 
fundamentalist denomination, a commonly utilized but problematic proxy for religious 
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fundamentalism, while the current study measured religious fundamentalism directly with 
a psychometrically-sound measure (RRF).  It may be, therefore, that there is greater 
variability of constructs, such as forgiveness or revenge, among fundamentalist 
denominational affiliates such that they are able to serve as moderators in the relationship 
with death penalty support.  Alternatively, those with higher levels of religious 
fundamentalism may have relatively consistent levels of forgiveness and revenge.   
Moreover, it could be that the results of the forgiveness and revenge measures 
were contaminated, at least to some extent, by social desirability (i.e., responding to items 
in the manner that is perceived to be more acceptable to others).  When the HFS (i.e., the 
measure of dispositional forgiveness utilized in the current study) was developed, 
Thompson and colleagues (2005) found that the HFS total score was moderately 
correlated with a measure of social desirability, indicating that responses to forgiveness 
items on that measure may be influenced by an individual’s desire to respond in a 
socially permissible manner.  Other research has similarly found low to moderate 
correlations between social desirability and various types of forgiveness measures (e.g., 
Brose, Rye, Lutz-Zois, & Ross, 2005).   
Although no research has been conducted to determine if religious 
fundamentalists are more likely to use impression management when responding to 
forgiveness measures, several forgiveness scholars have noticed a religion-forgiveness 
discrepancy.  That is, highly religious individuals tend to report that they are highly 
forgiving in general (i.e., have high levels of dispositional forgiveness); however, they 
tend to demonstrate lower levels of the forgiveness towards a specific offense or offender 
(i.e., have low levels of transgression-specific forgiveness; McCullough & Worthington, 
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1999).  Brown and colleagues (2007) found evidence of this discrepancy in religious 
fundamentalists: fundamentalism was predictive of positive attitudes towards forgiveness 
in general but not forgiveness towards specific individuals.  Therefore, it may be that 
some participants with higher levels of religious fundamentalism in the current study 
over-emphasized their levels of dispositional forgiveness due to social desirability.  A 
quick glance at the data for both samples supports this notion: the mean HFS total scores 
in individuals with a high level of religious fundamentalism (i.e., scoring in the highest 
quartile of possible RRF scores) was approximately 11 points higher than those with 
lower levels of religious fundamentalism. 
 Similar to forgiveness measures, several measures of trait anger and revenge have 
also demonstrated susceptibility to social desirability.  The measure of revenge utilized in 
the current study, the VS, has been shown to have a low correlation with social 
desirability in a sample of students (Greer et al., 2005; Stuckless & Goransen, 1992) and 
office workers (Lepofsky, 1993, as cited in Stuckless, Ford, & Vitelli, 1995) as well as 
moderate to high correlations with social desirability in inmate sample (Ford, Vitelli, & 
Stuckless, 1996; Stuckless et al., 1995).  Given the many religious directives against acts 
of revenge or harboring vengeful attitudes towards others, it is reasonable to suggest that 
those with a higher level of religious fundamentalism likely have a vested interest in 
endorsing fewer pro-revenge attitudes.  Therefore, in the current study, those with a 
higher level of religious fundamentalism may have under-reported their levels pro-
revenge attitudes due to social desirability.  The current study’s data also appear to 
support this notion: the mean VS total score of those participants with a high level of 
religious fundamentalism (i.e., scoring in the highest quartile of possible RRF scores) 
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was approximately 16 points lower than those with lower levels of religious 
fundamentalism.   
There are a few studies that have linked religious fundamentalism or 
fundamentalist characteristics to pro-revenge attitudes, vengeful behaviors, or support for 
a vigilante’s revenge act against a criminal (Bensko et al., 1995; Cota-McKinley et al., 
2001; Ellison & Musick, 1991; Greer et al., 2005; Miller, 2013).  Interestingly, in the 
current study, religious fundamentalism (as measured by the RRF) had a low negative 
correlation with revenge (as measured by the VS) for both non-students and students.  
This is a dissimilar result to the aforementioned studies and indicates that as the level of 
religious fundamentalism increases, the level of pro-revenge attitudes decrease.  This 
inconsistency may be another indicator of social desirability contamination or could be 
due to other factors (e.g., differences in how the constructs were measured, sample 
differences). 
As explicated above, there is a possibility that social desirability may have been a 
contributing factor to the current study’s results that those with higher levels of religious 
fundamentalism possessed higher dispositional forgiveness and lower vengeance attitudes 
than their counterparts.  However, the alternate possibility is as equally plausible: 
religious fundamentalists, as a group, may be more forgiving and less vengeful 
individuals.  If that were the case, it may impact the variability needed for forgiveness 
and revenge to serve as moderators in religious fundamentalism and death penalty 
support relationship. 
 Although the results of the moderation analyses indicated that revenge and 
forgiveness are not moderators of the religious fundamentalism-death penalty support 
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relationship, there were significant first-order effects in the analyses for both samples, 
indicating that religious fundamentalism, forgiveness, and revenge are statistical 
predictors of level of support for the death penalty.  Firstly, the current study provides 
convincing empirical evidence to support the previously-proposed theoretical connection 
between religious fundamentalism and death penalty support for both non-student and 
student samples.  All prior studies using a non-student sample that have found a 
significant relationship between fundamentalism and death penalty support did not 
employ a psychometrically sound measure of religious fundamentalism, instead typically 
relying on either fundamentalist denominational affiliation (i.e., FUND; Britt, 1998; 
Grasmick et al., 1993; Unnever et al., 2006; Unnever & Cullen, 2007; Young, 1992) or 
single religious beliefs or practices (Bader et al., 2010; Miller & Hayward, 2008; Stack, 
2004; Unnever & Cullen, 2006; Young, 1992) to operationalize the construct.  However, 
these findings are suspect due to potential measurement error (both denominational 
affiliation and single religious beliefs/practices can, at best, only serve as proxies); 
therefore, the current study provides the strongest empirical evidence to date that 
supports the religious fundamentalism-death penalty support association for non-student 
American adults.  The current study’s finding that religious fundamentalism is a predictor 
of level of death penalty support among students is dissimilar to the results of Whited et 
al. (2014) who found a null relationship between the two constructs.  One possible 
explanation for these differences could be the differences in how death penalty support 
was measured: the current study employed the 18-item RATDP total score, while Whited 
et al. (2014) utilized its less-refined predecessor, the 16-item ATDP total score.   
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 Pro-revenge attitudes were also found to be significant predictors of the levels of 
support for the death penalty for non-students and students, both in the moderation 
analyses and supplemental regression analyses.  More specifically, in the current study, 
revenge was the strongest predictor of level of death penalty support compared to all 
other variables for each model in which it was included.  These results, when considered 
in combination with other prior studies that also demonstrated a connection between pro-
vengeance attitudes and death penalty attitudes (McKee & Feather, 2008; Schadt & 
DeLisi, 2007), indicate that the revenge and death penalty support relationship is robust.   
The construct of revenge is often seen as the darker and more emotionally-laden 
dimension of a retributive justice orientation, especially when considering the tendencies 
of the vengeful to endorse disproportionately harsh punishments (von Hirsch, 1976) 
and/or derive emotional satisfaction from watching an offender suffer (Finckenauer, 
1988).  Retribution has been identified as a rationale underlying death penalty support in 
numerous studies (Baker, Lambert, & Jenkins, 2005; Ellsworth & Gross, 1994; Ellsworth 
& Ross, 1983; Firment & Geiselman, 1997; Lambert, Clarke, & Lambert, 2004; O’Neil et 
al., 2004; Schadt & DeLisi, 2007; Tyler & Weber, 1982), yet it is unclear if retribution is 
primarily motivated by desires of revenge (e.g., make the offender suffer, retaliate against 
the offender) or just deserts (e.g., fair and proportional punishment, providing 
compensation to victim(s) or society) in relation to death penalty support.  In other words, 
do those who endorse the death penalty for reasons of retribution have stronger 
underlying motivations of revenge or just deserts?  Gerber and Jackson (2013) found that 
of the two dimensions, revenge-motivated retribution alone predicted endorsement of 
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harsher punishment for offenders in general, but the extent to which this applies to capital 
punishment support has yet to be determined.   
 Finally, in the current study, dispositional forgiveness among non-student and 
student participants was also a significant predictor of level of support for the death 
penalty, but only in the moderation analyses.  Specifically, forgiveness was not a 
significant predictor of level of death penalty support when placed in the same model as 
revenge, but it was a significant predictor when placed alongside religious 
fundamentalism.  Due to the high negative correlation between revenge and forgiveness 
(i.e., r = -.54 for non-students, r = -.51 for students), it may be that revenge accounted for 
some of the variability that would have otherwise been accounted for by forgiveness.  
Additional research could be conducted in the future to determine if forgiveness is a 
predictor of death penalty support above and beyond the effects of revenge.  The current 
findings, however, suggest that at least in some cases, higher levels of dispositional 
forgiveness are associated with lower levels of death penalty support.  Other studies, 
utilizing shorter measures for both forgiveness and death penalty support, have 
demonstrated similar results (Applegate et al., 2000; Unnever & Cullen, 2006; Unnever 
et al., 2005). 
Research Implications 
Measuring Death Penalty Attitudes.  The current study’s confirmation of the five-
factor model of the RATDP in both non-student and student samples as well as findings 
from other studies (Harvey, 1986; O’Neil et al., 2004; Tyler & Weber, 1982) clearly 
indicates that death penalty attitudes are a multifaceted and complex construct.  More 
specifically, the findings of this study strongly suggest that an individual’s attitudes 
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towards the death penalty are not accurately represented by measurement of his/her 
general level of support for the sanction; instead, one’s level of agreement with several 
underlying rationales of the sentence is also necessary.  In other words, the traditionally 
utilized single, binary item (e.g., “Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons 
convicted of murder?”) that measures death penalty attitudes as a unitary construct is 
inherently problematic, in a theoretical and empirical sense. 
One major limitation of single item measures is that they fail to differentiate 
between individuals who prefer discretionary or mandatory sentencing procedures for the 
death penalty.  Those who report that they “agree” or “strongly agree” to the traditional 
single-item measure would likely disagree to the mandatory sentencing of the death 
penalty to all convicted murderers.  In fact, prior research suggests that even the 
staunchest of supporters or opponents of capital punishment predominately prefer 
discretionary privileges over mandatory sentencing (Ellsworth & Ross, 1983).  Therefore, 
only a multi-item instrument, such as the RATDP, should be utilized to measure such 
complex attitudes.  Secondly, single-item strategies give no indication of the underlying 
rationales that form one’s stance on capital punishment.  However, examination of the 
RATDP factors scores clearly provides a better understanding of these rationales, thereby 
helping to answer the “why” behind a person’s stance.  A third major limitation of single-
item measures is that it neglects to specify what sorts of defendants “should” or “should 
not” receive the death penalty.  The RATDP addresses this limitation: examination of 
items in the Support Statements and Sanction Exceptions factors clearly helps to begin 
answering the “who” behind a person’s stance.   
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In the present study, there were several differences between the death penalty 
attitudes of the non-student and student samples (e.g., metric invariance of the RATDP 
five-factor structure not supported, significant differences in all RATDP factor scores).  
The model invariance testing revealed that the RATDP was measuring a similar, but not 
the same construct between non-student and student participants.  Therefore, future 
researchers should avoid use of measures of death penalty attitudes that have only been 
developed using college student data on a non-student sample and avoid making 
generalizations about Americans’ death penalty attitudes from student data.   
Finally, because both the DPS and the RATDP focus on level of death penalty 
support, there is some overlap between the two measures.  For instance, several factors of 
both measures (e.g., RATDP Support Statements and DPS General Support) refer to 
similar arguments or have similar item content themes.  The RATDP’s inclusion of the 
arguments commonly cited by opponents of the death penalty, however, sets the RATDP 
apart from the exclusively pro-death penalty themes found in the DPS.  The neglect of 
measuring a participant’s level of agreement to both supportive and oppositional 
statements towards the death penalty can be problematic.  For instance, a person who 
strongly agrees with all supportive statements about the utility of the death penalty (e.g., 
it is necessary, a deterrent, less costly effective than life imprisonment, a way to 
compensate the victim’s family) but is also aware of some of the disadvantages of the 
sanction (e.g., it could lead to the execution of an innocent person, continues a harmful 
cycle of violence, it opposes a belief in forgiveness) may generate high scores on the DPS 
factors (indicating high levels of support for the death penalty), but would likely generate 
moderate scores on the RATDP (indicating only a moderate level of support for the death 
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penalty).  Therefore, predominately focusing on pro-death penalty arguments in a 
measure and thereby ignoring the salient conflicting viewpoints, as seen in the DPS, may 
lead to the over-inflation and/or mischaracterization of a participant’s level of support for 
the death penalty.   
Unlike the DPS, the RATDP was also developed with the intention of having a 
total score (calculated by combining all the factor scores together) to be used to quantify 
one’s overall level of support for the death penalty.  Initial evidence was found in the 
current study in support of the reliability and validity of the RATDP total score.  The 
DPS was not originally developed to have a total score, but some researchers have 
calculated and used a total score in their research regardless (e.g., Kandola & Egan, 
2014).  Instead, for the DPS, one’s general level support for the death penalty appears to 
be measured by the four-item DPS General Support factor score.  This subscale includes 
two general statements of support (e.g., “I think the death penalty is necessary.”) and 
opposition (e.g., “It is immoral for society to take a life regardless of the crime the 
individual has committed.”).  Although a four-item scale is likely a better way to measure 
general level of support for the death penalty than the standard single-item approach, the 
utilization of the RATDP total score, which is based on the sum of 18-items, is a more 
comprehensive measurement approach.  Therefore, researchers searching for a short scale 
with the capability to provide a comprehensive estimation of a participant’s overall level 
of support for the death penalty (based on their agreement with several specific 
arguments from both stances), may find the RATDP better suited for their purpose than 
the DPS. 
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Research on Predictors of Death Penalty Support.  This study provides evidence 
that when religious fundamentalism is measured by a psychometrically sound instrument 
(i.e., by an instrument such as the RRF), it is statistically predictive of level of death 
penalty support for both non-students and students, as measured by the RATDP.  Prior 
inconsistent findings between these two constructs could be due to measurement error, as 
in the case of the numerous aforementioned studies operationalizing religious 
fundamentalism by using denominational affiliation (e.g., FUND) or single religious 
beliefs or practices (e.g., Biblical literalism, harsh view of God), or differences in how 
death penalty support was measured, as in the case of Whited et al.’s (2014) study that 
utilized the ATDP.  Due to the existence of many strategies that can be utilized to 
operationalize religious fundamentalism (some more problematic than others), future 
researchers should clearly discuss how they measured religious fundamentalism and 
specifically describe their rationale for using a proxy measure of fundamentalism, such as 
FUND, when there are better validated operationalization strategies. 
Despite retribution being identified as the “most important contemporary pro-
death argument” (p. 52; Radelet & Borg, 2000), a notion supported by the findings of the 
current study, there have only been a few studies that have empirically examined 
retribution’s utility as a statistical predictor of death penalty support.  One reason why 
this may be the case is that participants previously viewed retribution as a less acceptable 
rationale for their support of the sanction than more instrumental arguments (Thomas & 
Foster, 1975; Vidmar & Ellsworth, 1974), thus participants and researchers alike may 
have neglected its importance.  Perhaps a more likely explanation is that there is no 
common consensus regarding how retribution should be operationalized in the death 
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penalty attitudes literature.  For example, McKee and Feather (2000) utilized the VS, 
which is only suited to measure the “revenge” dimension of retribution, while other 
researchers (e.g., Lambert et al., 2004; Whitehead & Blankenship, 2000) measured 
retribution with a single-item scale.  Simply put, the argument of retribution has not 
received much consideration in the death penalty literature.  Because pro-revenge 
attitudes were consistently the strongest predictor of level of death penalty support for all 
of the current study’s analyses in which the variable was included, future researchers 
should consider inclusion of a measure of revenge or, preferably, both dimensions of 
retribution in any model examining predictors of death penalty support.  
Implications for Jury Selection and Capital Murder Cases 
One of the most notable legal statements about the impact that a juror’s death 
penalty attitudes have on their sentencing decision is found in the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968): “But in Illinois, as in other States, the jury is 
given broad discretion to decide whether or not death is ‘the proper penalty’ in a given 
case, and a juror's general views about capital punishment play an inevitable role in any 
such decision” (p. 519).  It appears that there is a common legal understanding that 
jurors’ attitudes towards the death penalty can impact their decision-making but should 
not be too influential.  Specifically, in order to be eligible to serve as a jury member on a 
capital murder case, each potential juror, or venireperson, must be “death qualified.”  
Death qualification is not dependent on possessing a supportive stance towards capital 
punishment; instead, in order to be excluded from the jury of a capital case, the stance 
must be so firm that the potential juror believes he/she cannot make an objective 
decision.   
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Therefore, excludable jurors would include those who would never endorse a 
death sentence, no matter the aggravating factors of the case, as well as those who would 
always endorse a death sentence, regardless of any mitigating factors.  The latter of the 
two cases is much rarer; however, in general, only a small amount of the American 
population are considered excludable, demonstrated by findings that 5.8% Californians 
indicated that they could never impose the death penalty and 2.6% indicated that they 
would always impose the sanction (Haney, Hurtado, & Vega, 1994).  Although 
participants in the current study were not specifically asked questions to determine if they 
were death qualified, either extremely high or extremely low RATDP scores could 
potentially identify participants that may require additional questioning to determine 
excludability.  Furthermore, participants with extremely high scores on the Innocence 
Concerns or Sanction Exceptions factors in particular (i.e., demonstrating a very low 
level of concern regarding the nuances that sometimes make the sentencing or 
administration of the death penalty difficult), may be later identified as excludable based 
on their inability to impose other sanctions besides the death penalty. 
Based on the current study’s findings that death penalty attitudes are multifaceted, 
potential jurors likely possess several underlying (and perhaps competing) beliefs about 
the sanction that (a) they believe to differing extents and (b) form the basis for their 
overall stance on the death penalty.  Therefore, prosecution and defense attorneys are 
likely to gain a better understanding of a venireperson’s death penalty attitudes by asking 
about his/her agreement towards several different rationales of the sanction.  For 
example, asking potential jurors if they believe the death penalty is unfairly and 
disproportionately administered to minorities would provide much better information 
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about how venireperson’s attitudes influence their sentencing decisions (compared to 
solely knowing their general level of agreement with the usage of the death penalty) in a 
capital case involving a minority defendant.  Additionally, examining the RATDP 
Sanction Exceptions factor score (or responses to specific items) could help identify 
jurors that are likely favorable for the prosecution or defense in cases in which there is a 
question of the defendant’s cognitive functioning or mental health.   
Obtaining an understanding of a capital jury’s level of support for the death 
penalty, through a measure such as the RATDP, may also indicate which mitigating 
factors the defense may want to emphasize (or, alternatively, which aggravating factors 
the prosecution may want to highlight) during the sentencing phase of the trial.  For 
example, previous research indicates that the more a participant juror supported the death 
penalty, the more they argued to discount the offender’s history of child abuse and 
alcohol abuse as potential mitigating factors in death penalty sentencing (Stevenson, 
Bottoms, & Diamond, 2010).  Additionally, mock jurors who support the use of the death 
penalty are also more likely to interpret the defendant’s actions as indicative of criminal 
intent (Goodman-Delahunty et al., 1998). 
Regarding religious beliefs, there is evidence to suggest that those with higher 
levels of religious fundamentalism (as measured by RRF) are 70.5% more likely to find a 
non-capital defendant guilty than those who are less fundamentalist (Miller & Maskaly, 
2014).  Therefore, Miller and Maskaly suggest that criminal defense lawyers should 
attempt to exclude fundamentalist jurors, even though Lieberman and Sales (2006) have 
demonstrated that demographic characteristics (including religious variables) and 
attitudinal variables only account for a small portion of predictive validity in non-capital 
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trial outcome.  In a capital case, though, with higher stakes (i.e., the defendant may lose 
his/her life, not just his/her freedom), those representing the prosecution and defense are 
more likely to utilize every possible way to obtain the desired trial outcome.   
Research suggests that death qualification processes may unfortunately be biased 
towards the prosecution in capital cases.  Specifically, compared to their counterparts, 
death qualified participants appear to have a lower threshold of conviction for defendants 
(i.e., takes less evidence for guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be assumed; Thompson, 
Cowan, Ellsworth, & Harrington, 1984) and tend to interpret evidence from the 
prosecution in a more favorable manner (Poulson, Wuensch, Brown, & Braithwaite, 
1997; Thompson et al., 1984).  Death qualification processes may also disproportionately 
exclude participants who tend to provide oppositional attitudes towards the death penalty; 
for example, death qualified participants are more likely to have supportive death penalty 
attitudes (Butler, 2007), disproportionately include Catholics and Protestants (Fitzgerald 
& Ellsworth, 1984), and disproportionately exclude Jews, atheists, and agnostics 
(Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, 1984).  Other research has found that both Biblical literalism 
and religious fundamentalism are significant predictors of death qualification (Summers, 
Hayward, & Miller, 2010).  Due to these factors, Summers and colleagues note that “the 
pool from which jurors in death-penalty cases may be drawn is likely to be systematically 
skewed toward a particular set of beliefs and attitudes” (p. 3229; Summers et al., 2010). 
Considering the current study’s findings that religious fundamentalism is 
statistically predictive of level of death penalty support, when forgiveness or revenge is 
also considered, it seems clear that defense attorneys may want to strongly consider 
asking about an individual’s agreement with specific religious fundamentalist beliefs, 
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either through direct interviewing or supplemental questionnaires.  Similarly, defense 
attorneys should attempt to select non-fundamentalist venirepersons to serve in the jury.  
However, of even greater importance, defense attorneys may consider examining 
potential jurors’ pro-revenge attitudes as that variable was the strongest predictor of death 
penalty support in the current study’s analyses for both non-students and students.  Doing 
so may help defense attorneys ensure the jury is more balanced, with greater numbers of 
jurors holding ambivalent or oppositional attitudes towards the sanction.  This is 
particularly important considering that the deck may already be stacked against the 
defendant due to death qualification procedures.  Defense attorneys may also advocate 
for jury members to receive comprehensible instruction prior to deliberation on the 
importance of attempting to remain passive, objective decision-makers, thereby placing 
more substantive weight on the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine a death 
sentence, not one’s particular attitudes towards the death penalty.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
One limitation of the current study is the convenience sampling approach utilized 
for collecting non-student data.  Although MTurk data is far more representative of the 
United States population when compared to a college student sample (Paolacci et al., 
2010), there were some slight differences between the non-student sample collected and 
the American population (as counted in the 2010 Census), particularly the over-
representation of female and White participants.  It is likely that a national probability 
sampling method would collect more representative data; however, the data collected in 
the current study is likely more generalizable than studies utilizing a traditional college 
student samples.  A second limitation is related to the characteristics of the student 
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sample: most student participants were religious and reported high levels of religious 
fundamentalism.  Therefore, the student sample utilized in the current study is likely not 
representative of the college student population in the United States; however, it may 
provide a glimpse of the death penalty attitudes and religious beliefs of other college 
students that are either residing in the southern region of the country or have similarly 
strong religious beliefs.   
Thirdly, participants were unfortunately not asked to complete any measure of 
social desirability.  As such, it is difficult to determine if (or the extent to which) 
participants presented themselves in an overly favorable light on the measures of 
forgiveness or revenge and if it impacted the results of the study.  Future researchers 
examining these variables could alleviate this concern by including a measure of social 
desirability as a control variable in their statistical analyses.  Finally, participants were 
not questioned to determine if they were registered voters, jury eligible (e.g., had never 
committed a felony offense), or “death qualified,” so it would go beyond the scope of the 
data to make direct inferences about the level of death penalty support in those adults 
who are eligible to vote on proposed legislative acts regarding the death penalty or serve 
as a capital case juror.   
 Despite these limitations, future investigation into death penalty attitudes (and the 
underlying rationales that inform those attitudes) promises to be informative.  There are 
some additional steps that could be taken to further develop the RATDP.  Additional item 
development, particularly in factors that demonstrated low internal consistency reliability 
in students, could be undertaken to improve the reliability of the RATDP factors for 
students.  Moreover, considering the current study’s findings that pro-revenge attitudes 
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are the strongest predictor of level of support for the death penalty, it is unfortunate that 
the RATDP only has one retribution or revenge-related item (i.e., “‘Eye for an eye’ is the 
only way criminals will know that society is serious about protecting its citizens.”), an 
item that reflects the utility of social retribution for maintenance of law and order, not a 
sense of personal vengeance.  Extra items, or perhaps even another factor, could be 
created to include that salient theme.  Additional support for the construct validity of the 
RATDP could be found by investigating how the total and factor scores correlate with a 
measure of juror decision-making, such as the Pretrial Juror Attitude Questionnaire 
(PJAQ; Lecci & Myers, 2008), a measure of attitudes towards the insanity defense, such 
as the Insanity Defense Attitude Scale-Revised (IDAS-R; Skeem & Golding, 2001; 
Skeem, Louden, & Evans, 2004), and measures of other potentially-related personality 
traits (e.g., authoritarianism, dogmatism).  The predictive validity of the RATDP should 
also be examined, potentially by examining the RATDP’s ability to predict a death 
sentence verdict in a mock capital case study.  In the same vein, an interesting and “real-
world” applicable future direction of the RATDP would be to conduct analyses to 
determine a cutoff score that can predict if a participant or potential juror is death 
qualified.  
 As previously mentioned, one of the areas in which the present study was limited 
was the lack of information to determine if participants are registered voters or death 
qualified.  Future research could be conducted to determine attitudinal differences 
between the “death qualified” and “death excludable” participants in relation to the death 
penalty, as measured by the RATDP.  For example, answers could be found to questions 
like: Do death qualified or death excludable participants have a different factor structure 
104 
 
 
 
of death penalty attitudes?  Or, what differences exist between qualified and excludable 
participants in terms of the strength of their agreement towards specific arguments in 
support or opposition of the death penalty?  Future researchers could also seek to 
determine if the 5-factor model structure for the RATDP is replicated among a broader 
student sample that would, for instance, include students from several regions of the 
country and/or students from a more diverse religious orientation.    
 Additional research may also serve to continue the clarification of the relationship 
between religious fundamentalism and level of support for the death penalty.  For 
example, researchers could investigate the extent to which religious fundamentalism 
specifically predicts trial verdicts (i.e., the result of the innocence/guilt phase of a capital 
case), death sentence decisions (i.e., the result of the sentencing phase of a capital case), 
and/or the substantive weight those with high levels of religious fundamentalism place on 
either aggravating or mitigating factors in capital cases.  Miller and Hayward (2008) 
previously found that religious fundamentalism predicted death sentences, yet their 
findings should be replicated due to their poor operationalization of fundamentalism.   
Finally, further research can be conducted examining the relationship between 
death penalty support and the two other primary predictors in the current study: revenge 
and forgiveness.  Firstly, additional research could be conducted to determine if the “just 
deserts” dimension of retribution is a similarly significant and/or stronger predictor of 
death penalty support, compared to the “revenge” dimension.  Both dimensions of 
retribution should also be examined as potential predictors of sentencing verdicts in 
capital cases.  Given the above-described religion-forgiveness discrepancy seen in highly 
religious individuals, it would be interesting to determine if one’s level of dispositional 
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forgiveness or level of forgiveness towards a specific defendant in a mock capital case 
were more predictive of sentencing verdict.  Of course, if future researchers are interested 
in examining variables that tend to be viewed in highly positive terms, such as 
compassion or forgiveness, or highly negative terms, such as revenge, they should 
consider accounting for level of social desirability. 
Conclusion 
As Whitehead, Blankenship, and Wright (1999) very accurately state, “Given the 
literal life and death nature of capital punishment, it is important to continue research on 
this topic” (p. 250).  This is a particularly meaningful point considering that there are 
instances in which judges rely on social science research when deliberating about death 
penalty usage or previous sentencing verdicts (see Diamond, 1993; Diamond & Casper, 
1994).  This study, and a growing body of literature, indicates that one’s death penalty 
attitudes are multifaceted and are informed by, or associated with, a variety of rationales 
(e.g., innocence concerns, sanction exceptions, life imprisonment viability), religious 
factors (e.g., religious fundamentalism), traits (e.g., dispositional forgiveness), and 
associated attitudes (e.g., pro-revenge attitudes).  Death sentences, when completed, are 
irrevocable.  Therefore, decisions about the usage of the death penalty, both for capital 
case jurors considering a death sentence as well as legislative bodies considering 
procedural or policy changes, are not simple and should not be made lightly.  When a 
decision-maker (e.g., legislator, judge, attorney, juror, voter) turns to social science 
research to help illuminate areas of concern, it is essential that he/she can gather 
potentially useful information.  As such, it is vital that death penalty researchers avoid 
problematic and overly simplistic measurement strategies to measure death penalty 
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support (e.g., single-item, binary measures) or religious variables (e.g., denominational 
affiliation) and instead rely on valid, psychometrically-sound measurement strategies 
when conducting research.  Findings from quality death penalty research studies could 
challenge previously-held misconceptions about the level of public support for the death 
penalty and potentially serve to inform both prosecutorial and defense lawyers, judges, 
policy makers, and politicians.   
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APPENDIX A 
DEMOGRAPHIC FORM 
 
Demographic Information 
Please check or circle the response or fill in the blank where appropriate 
 
1. How old are you (in years)? ___ 
 
2. What is your gender? (circle one)  M F Other   
 
3. Which racial or ethnic group do you identify with? 
a. _______ African American/Black 
b. _______ American Indian/Native American 
c. _______ Asian/Asian American  
d. _______ Caucasian 
e. _______ Hispanic/Latino(a)  
f. _______ Biracial/Multiracial (Explain) 
_____________________________________ 
g. _______ Other (Explain) 
________________________________________________ 
 
4. How are you currently classified here at the University of Southern Mississippi? 
(student sample only) 
a. _______ Freshman 
b. _______ Sophomore 
c. _______ Junior 
d. _______ Senior 
e. _______ Other (Explain): 
_______________________________________________ 
 
5. What is the total number of years you have been in school (kindergarten through 
present)? _____ 
 
6. Have you ever been charged with a crime? Yes   No 
a. If yes, please list the crime(s) you have been charged with. 
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
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7. Have you ever been convicted of a crime? Yes   No 
a. If yes, please list the crime(s) you have been convicted of. 
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Have you ever been sentenced to time in jail or prison for a crime? 
a. If yes, please list the type of crime(s) you were incarcerated for. 
b. How long were you incarcerated for (total for all crimes)? 
 
9. Assign a numerical value that you believe best represents your political beliefs. 
 
1               2               3                4                5                6                7                8                9 
Extremely Conservative     Moderate                               Extremely Liberal  
 
10. To the best of your ability, please estimate your total household income (include 
parent’s income if you are still dependent on them for financial support. ________ 
 
Religious Identification Questions 
 
1. What is your spiritual/religious identification or denomination?  Please check one. 
____A) Agnostic   ____M) National Baptist Convention, Incorporated 
____B) Atheist   ____N) National Baptist Convention,  
       Unincorporated 
____C) Buddhist   ____O) Progressive National Baptist Convention 
____D) Catholic   ____P) Church of God in Christ 
____E) Lutheran   ____Q) LDS - Morman 
____F) Methodist  ____R) Hindu 
____G) Southern Baptist  ____S) Muslim/Islam 
____H) Missionary Baptist ____T) African Methodist Episcopal 
____I) Jewish   ____U) African Methodist/Episcopal Zion 
____J) Taoist   ____V) Christian Methodist Episcopal 
       ____K) Presbyterian  ____W) Unitarian-Universalist 
       ____L) Pagan/Wiccan      ____ X) Nondenominational 
       ____ Z) None   ____Y) Other (specify:_____________________) 
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2. Over the past year, about how often have you attended church or a religious meeting? 
a. More than once a week 
b. Once a week 
c. Two or three times per month 
d. Once per month 
e. Once every few months 
f. Very rarely, or only on religious holidays (e.g., Christmas, Easter) 
g. Never attended 
 
3. If applicable, to the best of your ability, please estimate the total amount of time (in 
years) you were or have been a member of a religious body or church.  _____ 
 
Death Penalty Questions 
1. Generally speaking, do you approve or disapprove of the death penalty for persons 
convicted of murder? 
a. Strongly Approve (if so, answer questions 2 & 3) 
b. Approve (if so, answer questions 2 & 3) 
c. Unsure (if so, skip to question 4) 
d. Disapprove (if so, skip to question 5) 
e. Strongly Disapprove (if so, skip to question 5) 
 
2. If you chose “strongly approve” or “approve” for question 1, think about your 
reasoning behind your approval of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder.  
Compare your reasoning with the options from the list below and choose the option 
that best describes your top rationale for your support of the death penalty.  If none of 
the options matches your reasoning, select “other” and give a brief description of your 
rationale. 
a. The death penalty prevents others from committing similar crimes in the 
future. 
b. The death penalty fits the crime (i.e., “eye for an eye”) 
c. The death penalty maintains order in society and prevents chaos 
d. The death penalty permanently prevents the criminal from committing further 
crimes 
e. The death penalty is cheaper than incarcerating a person in prison for life 
f. Other:_________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
3. If researchers found, and were completely certain, that the using the death penalty as 
a punishment for murderers did not deter other criminals from committing similar 
severe crimes, would you still favor using the punishment? 
a. Yes, I would still support the death penalty 
b. No, I would no longer support the death penalty 
 
Skip to question 6 
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4. If you chose “unsure” for question 1, please describe, to the best of your ability, why 
you chose this option.  
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Skip to question 6 
 
5.   If you chose “disapprove” or “strongly disapprove,” think about your reasoning 
behind your opposition of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder.  
Compare your reasoning with the options from the list below and choose the option 
that best describes your top rationale for your opposition of the death penalty.  If 
none of the options matches your reasoning, select “other” and give a brief 
description of your rationale. 
a. The death penalty is immoral and/or goes against my religious convictions 
b. The death penalty does not allow a convicted criminal the chance for 
rehabilitation 
c. The death penalty is irreversible; an innocent person could be executed 
d. The death penalty is unfairly dispensed to minorities and the impoverished 
e. The death penalty continues the cycle of violence 
f. The death penalty is more costly than incarcerating a person in prison for life 
g. Other:_________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
6.   Generally speaking, how committed are you to your stance on the death penalty?  
Assign a numerical value to signify your level of commitment, with lower numbers 
meaning strongly committed and higher numbers meaning strongly uncommitted. 
 
0                100 
Strongly Uncommitted         Strongly Committed 
 
7.   When considering your stance on the death penalty, how much did you think about 
and explore opposing stances on the death penalty before reaching your decision?  
Assign a numerical value to signify the level you thought about, researched, and/or 
explored opposing stances on the death penalty prior to reaching your own decision.  
Lower values signify active exploration of alternative stances and higher values 
signify no exploration of alternative stances. 
 
0                100 
No Exploration            Active  Exploration 
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8.   Generally speaking, do you approve or disapprove of the death penalty for persons 
convicted of serious crimes besides murder (e.g., rape)? 
a. Approve 
b. Disapprove 
c. Unsure 
 
9.   Generally speaking, do you believe that criminals are treated too harshly, not harshly 
enough, or just right in the criminal justice system? 
  A. Not Harshly Enough 
  B. Just Right 
  C. Too Harshly  
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APPENDIX B 
THE REVISED RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM SCALE 
This survey is part of an investigation of general public opinion concerning a variety of 
social issues.  You will probably find that you agree with some of the statements and 
disagree with others, to varying extents.  Please indicate your reaction to each of the 
statements by marking your opinion to the left of each statement, according to the 
following scale: 
 
Mark a  -4 if you very strongly disagree with the statement 
  -3 if you strongly disagree with the statement 
  -2 if you moderately disagree with the statement 
  -1 if you slightly disagree with the statement 
 
Mark a  +1 if you slightly agree with the statement 
  +2 if you moderately agree with the statement 
  +3 if you strongly agree with the statement 
  +4 if you very strongly disagree with the statement 
 
If you feel exactly and precisely neutral about a statement, mark a “0” next to it. 
 
You may find that you sometimes have different reactions to different parts of a 
statement.  For example, you might very strongly disagree (“-4”) with one idea in a 
statement, but slightly agree (“+1”) with another idea in the same item.  When this 
happens, please combine your reactions, and write down how you feel on balance (a “-3” 
in this case). 
 
1. God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, 
which must be totally followed. 
2. No single book of religious teachings contains all the intrinsic, fundamental truths 
about life.* 
3. The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and 
ferociously fighting against God. 
4. It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right 
religion.* 
5. There is a particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true, you 
can’t go any “deeper” because they are the basic, bedrock message that God has 
given humanity. 
6. When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the 
world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and the rest, who will not. 
7. Scriptures may contain general truths, but they should NOT be considered 
completely, literally true from beginning to end.* 
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8. To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally 
true religion. 
9. For this item, mark the answer choice “moderately agree.” 
10.  “Satan” is just the name people give to their own bad impulses.  There really is 
no such thing  as a diabolical “Prince of Darkness” who temps us.* 
11. Whenever science and sacred scripture conflict, science is probably right.* 
12. The fundamentals of God’s religion should never be tampered with, or 
compromised with others’ beliefs. 
13. All of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong teachings.  There is no 
perfectly true, right religion.* 
Note: * = con-trait item, for which the -4 to +4 scoring key is reversed. 
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APPENDIX C 
HEARTLAND FORGIVENESS SCALE 
 
Directions: In the course of our lives negative things may occur because of our own 
actions, the actions of others, or circumstances beyond our control. For some time after 
these events, we may have negative thoughts or feelings about ourselves, others, or the 
situation. Think about how you typically respond to such negative events. Next to each 
of the following items write the number (from the 7-point scale below) that best describes 
how you typically respond to the type of negative situation described.  There are no right 
or wrong answers. Please be as open as possible in your answers. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Almost 
Always 
False of Me 
 
More Often 
False of Me 
 
More Often 
True of Me 
 
Almost 
Always True 
of Me 
 
___ 1. Although I feel bad at first when I mess up, over time I can give myself some 
 slack. 
___ 2. I hold grudges against myself for negative things I’ve done. 
___ 3. Learning from bad things that I’ve done helps me get over them. 
___ 4. It is really hard for me to accept myself once I’ve messed up. 
___ 5. With time I am understanding of myself for mistakes I’ve made. 
___ 6. I don’t stop criticizing myself for negative things I’ve felt, thought, said, or done. 
___ 7. I continue to punish a person who has done something that I think is wrong. 
___ 8. With time I am understanding of others for the mistakes they’ve made. 
___ 9. I continue to be hard on others who have hurt me. 
___ 10. Although others have hurt me in the past, I have eventually been able to see them 
 as good people. 
___ 11. If others mistreat me, I continue to think badly of them. 
___ 12. When someone disappoints me, I can eventually move past it. 
___ 13. When things go wrong for reasons that can’t be controlled, I get stuck in negative 
 thoughts about it. 
___ 14. With time I can be understanding of bad circumstances in my life. 
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___ 15. If I am disappointed by uncontrollable circumstances in my life, I continue to 
 think negatively about them. 
___ 16. I eventually make peace with bad situations in my life. 
___ 17. It’s really hard for me to accept negative situations that aren’t anybody’s fault. 
___ 18. Eventually I let go of negative thoughts about bad circumstances that are beyond 
 anyone’s control. 
 
Scoring Instructions: 
To calculate the scores for the HFS total and its three subscales, first reverse score items 
2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, and 17. Then, sum the values for the items that compose each 
subscale (with appropriate items being reverse scored): HFS total (items 1–18), HFS Self 
subscale (items 1–6), HFS Other subscale (items 7–12), HFS Situation subscale (items 
13–18). 
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APPENDIX D 
VENGEANCE SCALE 
 
Instructions:  Below there are a number of statements that describe attitudes in different 
people.  There are no right or wrong answers, only opinions.  For every statement, please: 
a. Read the statement 
b. Decide whether you agree or disagree using the following scale: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Neither 
disagree 
nor agree 
Agree 
slightly 
Agree 
Agree 
strongly 
 
___ 1. It’s not worth my time or effort to pay back someone who has wronged me. (R) 
___ 2. It is important to me to get back at people who have hurt me. 
___ 3. I try to even the score with anyone who hurts me. 
___ 4. It is always better not to seek vengeance. (R) 
___ 5. I live by the motto “Let bygones be bygones.” (R) 
___ 6. There is nothing wrong in getting back at someone who has hurt you. 
___ 7. I don’t just get mad, I get even. 
___ 8. I find it easy to forgive those who have hurt me. (R) 
___ 9. I am not a vengeful person. (R) 
___ 10. I believe in the motto “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” 
___ 11. Revenge is morally wrong. (R) 
___ 12. If someone causes me trouble, I’ll find a way to make them regret it. 
___ 13. People who insist on getting revenge are disgusting. (R) 
___ 14. If I am wronged, I can’t live with myself unless I get revenge. 
___ 15. Honor requires that you get back at someone who has hurt you. 
___ 16. It is usually better to show mercy than to take revenge. (R) 
___ 17. Anyone who provokes me deserves the punishment that I give them. 
___ 18. It is always better to “turn the other cheek.” (R) 
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___ 19. To have the desire for vengeance would make me feel ashamed. (R) 
___ 20. Revenge is sweet. 
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APPENDIX E 
DEATH PENALTY SCALE 
 
Directions:  Please respond whether you agree or disagree with the following statements 
on a scale from 1 to 9, where 1 represents that you "strongly disagree" with the statement 
and 9 represents that you "strongly agree" with the statement. 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
 Strongly  
Agree 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. It is immoral for society to take a life 
regardless of the crime the individual has 
committed. 
         
2. Executing a person for premeditated murder 
discourages others from committing that crime 
in the future. 
         
3. The death penalty is the just way to 
compensate the victim’s family for some 
murders. 
         
4. It is more cost efficient to sentence a murderer 
to death rather than to life imprisonment. 
         
5. The death penalty should be used more often 
than it is. 
 
         
6. There are some murderers whose death would 
give me a sense of personal satisfaction. 
         
7. There is no such thing as a sentence that truly 
means "life without parole." 
         
8. The desire for revenge is a legitimate reason 
for favoring the death penalty. 
         
9. Executing a murderer is less expensive than 
keeping him in jail for the rest of his life. 
         
10. The death penalty does not deter other 
murderers. 
 
         
11. No matter what crime a person has 
committed executing them is a cruel punishment. 
         
12. Even when a murderer gets a sentence of life 
without parole, he usually gets out on parole. 
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13. I think the death penalty is necessary. 
 
         
14. The death penalty makes criminals think 
twice before committing murder. 
         
15. Society has a right to get revenge when 
murder has been committed. 
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APPENDIX F 
REVISED ATTITUDES TOWARD THE DEATH PENALTY SCALE 
Scale Items and Directions:  This questionnaire contains a set of attitude statements.  
There are no right or wrong answers: we are interested in your opinions.  Please read 
each statement carefully and then circle the response that reflects your reaction. 
 
SA = strongly agree, A = agree, U = undecided, D = disagree, SD = strongly disagree  
 
1. If there is any doubt about a defendant’s guilt, he or she should not be executed.** 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
2. “Eye for an eye” is the only way criminals will know that society is serious about 
protecting its citizens. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
3. The death penalty is given too often to convicted defendants from a racial minority.** 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
4. People remain on death row too long before their execution is carried out. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
5. Being sentenced to death for a horrific crime is too easy and quick of a punishment; a 
person who committed murder should be made to spend the rest of their life behind 
bars.** 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
6. Giving the death penalty to serial killers or murderers of horrific crimes is one 
method that the state can use to discourage future heinous murders. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
7. The only way to control some potential crime is to enforce the death penalty. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
8. I am against the execution of a defendant who committed a crime when they were 
suffering from a severe mental illness, such as schizophrenia.** 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
9. Those sentenced to life imprisonment usually get out on parole. 
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SA  A  U  D  SD 
10. No civilized society permits capital punishment.** 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
11. Human beings and/or the government/society shouldn’t have the power to put a 
person to death, no matter what crime they committed.**   
SA  A  U  D  SD 
12. It is wrong that the death penalty is given to more poor defendants than those with 
financial resources.** 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
13. No matter the severity of the crime, any offender under the age of 18 should not 
receive the death penalty.**  
SA  A  U  D  SD 
14. If a woman committed a crime along with a man, and he is sentenced to death, she 
should be too. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
15. There is no sentence that truly means “life without parole;” unless an offender is put 
to death, they could always get out of prison one day. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
16. Since the person receiving the death penalty did not respect the victim’s life then they 
deserve to die. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
17. I am opposed to the execution of mothers who have young children.** 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
18. It is necessary to permit the death penalty in order to reduce the murder rate. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
19. I believe that it is morally wrong to have the power to take anyone’s life, regardless 
of the reasoning or the suspected crime.** 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
20. Any person convicted of premeditated murder, no matter their race, gender, age, or 
level of income should be considered to receive the death penalty. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
122 
 
 
 
21. If a defendant on death row wants a DNA test of evidence, the state should 
automatically grant it.** 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
22. One major disadvantage/con of the death penalty is the possibility that an innocent 
person may be executed.**   
SA  A  U  D  SD 
23. Giving someone the death penalty does not allow them to experience enough 
punishment; having them live out the rest of their days behind bars is a more suitable 
penalty.** 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
24. The possibility of being executed serves as a deterrent against committing violent 
crimes. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
25. The death penalty goes against my moral and/or religious convictions.** 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
26. A murderer may “deserve” to die, but humans cannot objectively determine who 
should die because of our biases.** 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
27. Laws that permit the death penalty devalue the worth of every human life.** 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
28. It is wrong to sentence a person diagnosed with mental retardation to death.** 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
29. Men and women should be treated equally when the death sentence is considered. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
30. A judge should have the right to sentence a defendant to death, even if the jury has 
recommended life in prison. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
31. It is better that one murderer die than many people die at the hands of that one 
murderer.   
SA  A  U  D  SD 
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32. Laws permitting the death penalty continue a harmful cycle by using violence to 
punish violence.** 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
33. The death penalty gives the victim’s family security in knowing that they don’t have 
to fear future harm from the perpetrator. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
34. It is immoral for society to take a human life, no matter the circumstances.** 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
35. Carrying out an execution of a convicted murderer is far more costly than keeping 
them in prison for the rest of their lives.** 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
36. Executing a murderer is the only way to be certain they will never hurt others again. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
37. People on death row are permitted to appeal their sentence too often. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
38. Executing a convicted murderer can help give the victim’s family a sense of closure 
and peace. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
39. The death penalty goes against my beliefs about the importance of forgiving others 
for their wrongdoings.** 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
40. The appeal processes and procedures for convicted inmates on death row allow 
defendants ample opportunity to provide evidence that they are innocent of their 
charges. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
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APPENDIX G 
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE DEATH PENALTY SCALE (16-ITEM) 
 
Scale Items and Directions:  This questionnaire contains a set of attitude statements.  
There are no right or wrong answers: we are interested in your opinions.  Please read 
each statement carefully and then circle the response that reflects your reaction. 
 
SA = strongly agree, A = agree, U = undecided, D = disagree, SD = strongly 
disagree  
 
1. A judge should have the right to sentence a defendant to death, even if the jury 
has recommended life in prison. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
2. People on death row are permitted to appeal their sentence too often. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
3. If there is any doubt about a defendant’s guilt, he or she should not be executed.* 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
4. If a defendant on death row wants a DNA test of evidence, the state should 
automatically grant it.* 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
5. People remain on death row too long. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
6. It is wrong to sentence a mentally retarded person to death.* 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
7. Those sentenced to life imprisonment often get out on parole. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
8. Men and women should be treated equally when the death sentence is considered. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
9. I am opposed to the execution of women who are pregnant.* 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
10. No civilized society permits capital punishment.* 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
11. It is necessary to permit the death penalty in order to reduce the murder rate. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
12. The possibility of being executed serves as a deterrent against committing violent 
crimes. 
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SA  A  U  D  SD 
13. Laws that permit the death penalty devalue the worth of every human life.* 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
14. Laws permitting the death penalty use violence to punish violence.* 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
15. The only way to control some potential crime is to enforce the death penalty. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
16. If a woman committed a crime along with a man, and he is sentenced to death, she 
should be too. 
SA  A  U  D  SD 
 
 
 
 
*Indicates a reverse-coded item 
 
Factor 1 (Sentencing Disputes):  Items 1, 2, 5, & 7 
Factor 2 (Sanction Exceptions):  Items 3, 4, 6, & 9 
Factor 3 (Crime Control):  Items 11, 12, & 15 
Factor 4 (Opposition Concerns):  Items 10, 13, & 14 
Factor 5 (Gender Equality):  Items 8 & 16 
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APPENDIX H 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD NOTICE OF COMMITTEE ACTION 
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APPENDIX I 
INFORMED CONSENT FORMS 
Attitudes Towards Social Issues Study Consent Form (M-Turk) 
 
You are being asked to participate in a study about your attitudes towards social issues.  
The researchers of this study are Will Whited, M.A. and Jon Mandracchia, Ph.D. at the 
University of Southern Mississippi, Department of Psychology. 
 
Background Information: 
The purpose of this study is to gather information to better understand your attitudes 
towards social issues and your social experiences in several domains.  
 
Procedures: 
If you agree to participate in this study, the following will be asked of you. You will be 
asked to complete several questionnaires and a demographic sheet online. The amount of 
time expected for participation is this study is 20-30 minutes. 
 
Risks and Benefits of being in the Study 
The risks associated with your participation are minimal. You may find that you may 
become bored or tired when completing questions. Additionally, you will be asked some 
sensitive questions, such as your personal beliefs and stances on social issues.  Some 
individuals may feel slight psychological discomfort when answering these questions.  
Some people report having higher self-awareness of their own attitudes by responding to 
questions.   
 
Confidentiality 
The records of this study will be kept private.  You will not be asked to provide your 
name. In any sort of report that might be published from this data, no identifiable 
material for any participant will be included. By consenting to participate in this 
study, each participant’s MTurk worker identification number will be collected for the 
sole purpose of screening to prevent any participant from completing the survey more 
than one time.  All MTurk worker ID numbers will be deleted from all datasets after data 
collection is completed.  Research records will be stored securely and only the 
researchers involved in this study will have access to the research records.  
 
Compensation 
Upon successful completion of the survey, you will be paid 15 to 50 cents into your 
MTurk account.  There will be several questions throughout the survey designed to 
determine if you are attending to item content.  If correct answers are not given for these 
questions, then you will not be compensated.  Additionally, each participant will only be 
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compensated once for completing the survey.  Participants that attempt to complete the 
survey more than one time will only be compensated once, after their first completed 
survey. 
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study 
Participation in this study is completely up to you. Whether you decide to participate or 
not will not affect your current or future relations with the University of Southern 
Mississippi.  If you decide to participate, you are free to not answer any question or 
withdraw at any time without affecting those relationships.  
 
Contacts and Questions 
Again, the researchers conducting this study are Will Whited and Dr. Jon Mandracchia.  
If you have questions later, you may contact Will Whited at 
William.Whited@eagles.usm.edu or Dr. Mandracchia at Jon.Mandracchia@usm.edu. 
This project has been reviewed by the Human Subjects Protection Review Committee, 
which ensures that research projects involving human subjects follow federal regulations.  
Any questions or concerns about rights as a research subject should be directed to the 
chair of the Institutional Review Board, The University of Southern Mississippi, 118 
College Drive #5147, Hattiesburg, MS 39406-0001, (601) 266-6820.  
 
I have read and understand the above information.  By clicking below, I am indicating 
that I am at least 18 years of age and that I consent to participate in this study. 
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Attitudes Towards Social Issues Consent Form (SONA) 
 
You are being asked to participate in a study about your attitudes towards social issues.  
The researchers of this study are Will Whited, M.A. and Jon Mandracchia, Ph.D. at the 
University of Southern Mississippi, Department of Psychology. 
 
Background Information: 
The purpose of this study is to gather information to better understand your attitudes 
towards social issues and your social experiences in several domains.  
 
Procedures: 
If you agree to participate in this study, the following will be asked of you. You will be 
asked to complete several questionnaires and a demographic sheet online. The amount of 
time expected for participation is this study is 20-30 minutes. 
 
Risks and Benefits of being in the Study 
The risks associated with your participation are minimal. You may find that you may 
become bored or tired when completing questions. Additionally, you will be asked some 
sensitive questions, such as your personal beliefs and stances on social issues.  Some 
individuals may feel slight psychological discomfort when answering these questions.  
Some people report having higher self-awareness of their own attitudes by responding to 
questions.   
 
Compensation 
You must get to the end of the survey to be awarded your SONA credit for participating. 
Upon successful completion of the survey, you will receive .5 SONA credit.  There will 
be several questions throughout the survey designed to determine if you are attending to 
item content.  If correct answers are not given for these questions, then you will receive 
no SONA credit. 
 
Confidentiality 
The records of this study will be kept private.  You will not be asked to provide your 
name. In any sort of report that might be published from this data, no identifiable 
material for any participant will be included. Research records will be stored securely 
and only the researchers involved in this study will have access to the research records. 
No information that you provide for this study will be disclosed to your employer(s) or 
course instructor(s). 
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study 
Participation in this study is completely up to you. Whether you decide to participate or 
not will not affect your current or future relations with the University of Southern 
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Mississippi.  If you decide to participate, you are free to not answer any question or 
withdraw at any time without affecting those relationships.  
 
Contacts and Questions 
Again, the researchers conducting this study are Will Whited and Dr. Jon Mandracchia.  
If you have questions later, you may contact Will Whited at 
William.Whited@eagles.usm.edu or Dr. Mandracchia at Jon.Mandracchia@usm.edu. 
This project has been reviewed by the Human Subjects Protection Review Committee, 
which ensures that research projects involving human subjects follow federal regulations.  
Any questions or concerns about rights as a research subject should be directed to the 
chair of the Institutional Review Board, The University of Southern Mississippi, 118 
College Drive #5147, Hattiesburg, MS 39406-0001, (601) 266-6820.  
 
I have read and understand the above information.  By clicking below, I am indicating 
that I am at least 18 years of age and that I consent to participate in this study. 
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